University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

12-2021

Am I Stigmatized? An experimental examination of high-status
experiences of stigma.
Christopher F. Silver
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Christopher-Silver@utc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Social Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Silver, Christopher F., "Am I Stigmatized? An experimental examination of high-status experiences of
stigma.. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2021.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/7007

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Christopher F. Silver entitled "Am I
Stigmatized? An experimental examination of high-status experiences of stigma.." I have
examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend
that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, with a major in Psychology.
Michael A. Olson, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Gordon M Burghardt, Garriy Shteynberg, Ralph W. Hood Jr, Rosalind I. J. Hackett
Accepted for the Council:
Dixie L. Thompson
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Am I Stigmatized? An experimental examination of high-status experiences of stigma.

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Christopher F. Silver
December 2021

ii
Dedication
For my son Jamison H. Silver, who is my continued inspiration for scholarship and teaching. He
reminds me every day of the power of questions, curiosity, and deductive reasoning in
understanding the human condition. Thank you, son, for giving me new life and finding my voice
in the cacophony of inquiry, to my family who has unconditionally supported my endeavors and the
teachers, professors, advisors, and mentors who have guided me on this long, arduous journey of
discovery. Most importantly, this is dedicated to my students past, present, and future, who serve as
my continued motivation to seek new knowledge. You inspire me to be a better educator and
researcher.

iii
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my sincerest appreciation to Dr. Michael Olson, whose patience, wisdom,
intellectual complexity, and belief in me pushed me in productive and fruitful ways. He is not only
a strong dissertation chair and mentor but a model academic demonstrating for me both intellectual
and emotional maturity at all steps of my graduate journey. In terms of my doctoral committee, I
would like to thank Dr. Gordon Burghardt, whose sage-like wisdom provided a space for discussing
big ideas and theories that prompted me to pursue interests in several other research areas.
Moreover, thank you to Dr. Garriy Shteynberg, who showed me that theory has a place in social
psychology and can result in novel yet precise hypothesis testing. Thank you to Dr. Rosalind I. J.
Hackett who reminded me that I should stay true to my interdisciplinary training in generating
novel study designs using psychology, sociology, anthropology, and religious studies. Finally, I
would like to thank Dr. Ralph W. Hood Jr. from UT Chattanooga, who has been my greatest
inspiration in pursuing graduate studies. He has stayed by my side for over 20 years and continues
to push me to be better than I am.
Additionally, others at UT have contributed to my journey. Dr. Lowell Gaertner served as
the model of professor I ascribe to be in my classroom. He is calm, patient, kind, and understanding
while also deploying a rigorous and detailed oriented curriculum within our statistics classes. I seek
to honor his teaching style in my classroom each day. I would like to thank Ms. Connie Ogle, who
professionally and personally cared about every one of us in the psychology program. She served as
the bridge between my Appalachian background and UT by helping others and myself navigate the
graduate school experience. She is truly our graduate mom. I would like to thank Dr. Jeff Larsen,
who taught me so much about myself but, most importantly, the precision of language in
communicating and writing. He showed me the world of science from a different perspective.
Thank you to my lab mates Dr. David March, Dr. Katie Fritzlen, and Ms. Laura Beard Gill, who all
three have shown me the diversity of ideas and the respect of others through our continued
conversations, debates, and research interests. I am better for having known you. Thank you to my

iv
fellow cohort member, Dr. Michael Oliver, who was my academic best friend by studying with me
and working together to achieve our graduate goals.
Beyond UT, others also helped me achieve this life milestone. Beyond Drs. Olson and Hood, there
is Dr. David W. Rausch. Dr. Rausch encouraged me to attend UT from UTC upon completing my
Ed.D. program and has continued to create opportunities and support my career aspirations.
Through his guidance and kindness, I have been able to achieve my life goal. Given the challenges
of being a non-traditional student, I was fortunate to have supervisors in my various jobs who
supported my career goals and attending the program at UT. Those individuals are Dr. Carolyn
Schreeder, who hired me on a nursing grant at UTC and permitted me to participate in classes at
UT while also working for her. My second supervisor, Dr. Bryan Samuel, who I worked for in
UTC’s Office of Equity and Diversity, allowed me to attend class while working on my
dissertation. And again, last but not least, Dr. David Rausch who permitted me to continue my
graduate studies while employed for him in Academic Affairs and eventually as a faculty member
of the Learning and Leadership program at UTC.

v
Abstract
Stigma is a highly researched aspect of social psychology primarily focusing on outgroup
perceptions of stigma or the behaviors associated with high-status individuals toward low-status
individuals. Two studies sought to explore high-status perceptions of perceived stigma, focusing on
the common variables associated with stigma within low-status groups. This was to address a
growing perception among high-status individuals that they experience stigma given their identity.
As a focus, this study sampled White Males (Study One) and Christians (Study Two) from the
United States. As part of experimental manipulation, we presented participants with three potential
conditions. Condition one where participants read an article asserting their group would lose
majority status in the future, condition two where participants read an article asserting, they would
experience little to no loss of majority status, and condition three as control. This study then used a
series of measures including a measure of individual and group stigma modified for the target
group, the Quick Discrimination Index as a measure of prejudice, group with emotion self-report
measures where participants indicated what groups they identified as being emotionally associated,
a measure of individual self-esteem, measures of individual and group power, as well as moderators
of social dominance orientation and collective self-esteem. For Study Two, we also included
measures of concealment and disclosure, given that Christian identity can be concealed. Findings
indicated that while the manipulations had little to no effect on the dependent variables, Social
Dominance Orientation was most likely associated with perceptions of Stigma. Further, it appears
there is a perception of lower collective self-esteem for those who perceive themselves to be more
stigmatized and higher self-esteem for those with lower perceptions of Stigma.
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Study
The face of America has changed extensively since the turn of the 20th century. While
racial tension between whites and blacks has continued, other ethnic and racial identities have
emerged due to various waves of immigration to the United States. Currently, some whites
perceive themselves as potentially losing majority status. In a recent poll, 55% of White
Americans surveyed indicated that they believe white Americans face discrimination. Notably,
11% of whites reported experienced discrimination applying or participating in college. Further,
as part of the NPR/Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health
study, 13% of white participants reported pay disparities in their jobs, and 19% of the overall
white participant sample reported discrimination in applying for jobs (Gonyea, 2017). Indeed, this
group may perceive themselves to experience discrimination, yet what may be driving this
perception may be unclear. Is it the loss of power, loss of majority status, or a shift in the social
value of identifying whiteness as the prototypical normal?
Some of the same groups of immigrants who have changed the racial and ethnic
landscape of the US have had an equal impact on the religious landscape. Religious identity has
also experienced similar waves of change due to immigration and the emergence of new religious
traditions within the American religious landscape. Further, while it is difficult to conceal racial
and ethnic identity, religious identity can be hidden (through clothing, social connections,
language). At the turn of the 20th century, much of the competition for new members was among
the majority of Christian groups throughout the United States, with some minor urban exceptions.
Historically, many denominations held state and regional control, where the marketplace of
ideology and identity between Christian and non-Christian groups has shifted extensively.
Further, secularization and spirituality have shifted normative religious identity beyond the
institution of religion toward a more individualized belief system (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009).
From the perspective of US Christians, these shifts in ideology and identity have likely signaled
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losses in membership and social representation during the late 1990s and early 2000s. For
example, LifeWay Research (2015) observed that Christians believe that their religious liberty is
in decline (60% in 2015 instead of 54% in 2013). LifeWay also reported that Christians believe
that they experience increasing intolerance (63% in 2015 from 50% in 2013); a similar pattern is
reported by the Brookings Institute (49% in 2016). The Brookings study also observed that many
white Americans believe they are discriminated against (57%). Based on these correlational
studies, it appears there is a growing concern about declining Christian influence (Smietana,
2016).
Groups have various levels of power and influence. For some, their group has social
dominance over others, which could be called high status. In contrast, other groups have some or
limited power, which could be called low status. One’s group status likely means they respond
differently to situations of stigma or adverse events (Kahn, Barreto, Kaiser & Silva Rego, 2016;
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Further, one’s group power may vary based on the
social and geographical landscape. The correlational studies presented above demonstrate a rising
concern among high-status groups that their representation or influence is declining. They also
demonstrate that high-status individuals perceive an increase in stigma toward their groups.
While there is extensive research on perceived stigma, nearly all (if not all) of this work has
explored stigma among relatively low-status groups (e.g., Black Americans, women, those with
disabilities). Conversely, studies related to white males has mainly focused on issues of regional
poverty, including loss of industries such as coal, moving of factories out of rural America,
industrial agriculture, and other influences related to globalization that has impacted those in
blue-collar industries (Duncan & Lamborghini, 1994; Anglin 2002).
Further, from the perspective of religion, many secular groups have pushed to block the
placement of the Ten Commandments in govermental spaces and the blocking of prayer at high
school and college football games as well as ceremonies, and shifts in language toward more
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secular greetings, such as seasons greetings becoming “Happy Holidays.” Many of these social
shifts have been experienced as an attack on Christianity (Eberstadt, 2016). There is evidence that
these social shifts have resulted in a perceived change in both white and religious perceptions of
prejudice and their perceived loss of social status. From these examples, there appears to be
evidence of a shift in appraisal among those who could be considered high status either from their
social hierarchy in the form of power or their majority representation in society. Nevertheless,
these data show that such individuals may experience a change in their social status. For some,
they perceive this change in a variety of ways, including possible discrimination or prejudice. It is
unclear if higher-status individuals also perceive themselves to experience stigma and, by
extension, negative intergroup emotions similar to low-status groups. This study explores how
one’s experience of stigma influences these variables as a function of the perceived change in
group status.
Overarching Research Questions for these Studies
In the following section, we will discuss the origins of stigma theory and research.
Beginning with the work of Goffman (1963), Katz (1981), and Bos et al. (2013), this discussion
explores both the experience of the stigmatized as well as the stigmatizer as a transactional
relationship within the perspectives of social psychological research as well as evolutionary
theory (with some theoretical overlap between the two). How does stigmatization can occur in
human relations. What are the various social and psychological structures promoting and
sustaining such discrimination and identifying marks deemed a stigma? More specifically this
dissertation is interested in the following general questions:
Do high-status individuals perceive themselves to be stigmatized when presented with
data suggesting their group is losing majority status? Further, do high-status individuals
have a personal experience of stigma or perceive their group to have been stigmatized
even though they may not have experienced it personally?
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If high-status individuals perceive themselves to be stigmatized at either the individual or
group level, do they experience the same emotional reactions as low-status groups?
Does the importance of the group to its membership magnify the effects of stigma among
high-status groups?
Essentially, we are interested in those who perceive themselves to be stigmatized and are also
considered members of high-status groups (who are considered to enjoy privileges such as greater
access to resources). Of particular interest are two groups of high-status individuals: White Males
and Christians.

Operational Definitions
This study provides operational definitions of terms to provide greater clarity of design. These are
as follows:
Stigma – is a mark or attribute that signals differences to others from social norms. Such a
difference can infer devalued group membership or individual threats to others. This mark can
occur at the individual or group level. This study will mainly focus on group-level stigma and
include questions related to one’s own experience of stigma. Please note that while some stigma,
such as a disability, can be consistent access cultures, other stigmas may be socially constructed
and can vary based on one’s group power within a particular society (Goffman, 1963; Crocke,
Major, & Steele, 1998). Stigma can be evaluated in two ways. One way is regarding group
stigma, where an individual identifies as part of a group and is bound to the positive or negative
implications of identifying with the group even if they personally have not experienced stigma.
The second type of stigma evaluation is when the individual themselves is stigmatized either due
to their group membership or a marker, which signifies their group membership to others
(regardless of how accurate the appraisal is of their actual ability).
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Prejudice – Generally, prejudice has been characterized as an overgeneralized incorrect
assumption of a person based on their membership in a group. Allport (1954) described these
attitudes as lacking flexibility as people are quick to make judgments. Samson (1999) suggested
that these judgments are generally unjustified. However, they can be positive or negative.
Further, these attitudes can be socially reinforced at the group level and individually subjective
based on one’s experience (Glick et al., 2000). Prejudice is simply the automatic activation of
discrimination based on snap judgement based on social or behavior cues.
Social Status – An individual or group’s station or rank in the overall hierarchy of society. One’s
status or group membership can give them social benefits or influence over others. Status can be
given at birth by their membership in a particular group or earned or lost as culture or society
changes (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics 2000). One’s social status givens them perceived
power over other groups who may not share the same level of power or influence. It also means
they may have influence asserted over them if they are a lower status. In this case, we speak to
the numerical status represented in the United States or, more specifically, White Male and
Christian percentages of representation. One aspect that is unclear about status is the difference
between representation and perceived group power. In some cultural contexts, these are not
necessarily the same. However, for this study, high status is also a majority status within the
United States social context.
•

High Status – these are individuals who generally can assert themselves within
society. For high status individuals, they have social or normative influence
simply by their membership in their group. Those in high-status positions are
more likely to speak and interrupt others in a discussion. They are more likely to
respond in anger to interactions of conflict as indicated by facial responses
(Tiedens & Ellsworth Batja Mesquita 2000; Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics
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2000; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Keating, 1985; Carli, LaFleur, &
Loeber, 1995).
•

Low Status – These are individuals with diminished social influence related to
their perceived group membership. They have relatively low power and are likely
conscious of their social rank within a larger hierarchy. Low status has been
associated with anxiety, performance issues, sadness and guilt, and low appraisal.
Further, low-status individuals may also experience feelings of vulnerability and
insecurity in interacting with high-status individuals (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber,
1995; Yukl & Falbe, 1990). There is already evidence of potential outcomes
related to one’s group rank in society (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, &
Monarch, 1998). Low status is a loss of or inadequate representation in the
United States.

Allegiant Religious Traditions are religious traditions considered culturally normative and typical
within a particular community. An Allegiant religious tradition has low social tension with the
greater social and cultural community. If a religious denomination or faith tradition falls into the
allegiant classification, it relates much to the broader community’s perception of that tradition to
be culturally normative (Bromley, 1998)
Contestant Religious Traditions – generally participate within the larger social and cultural
community. However, they have beliefs, rituals, practices, and/or traditions that seem culturally
different from mainstream culture. These differences create some social tension within the
broader culture where their tradition may be called into question, but they can continue to practice
their faith (Bromley 1998).
Subversive Religious Traditions – are religious groups with the highest amount of social tension
as they generally avoid interaction with the greater society (e.g. Amish, International Society for
Krishna Consciousness or colloquially known as Hare Krishna) in place of their own cultural and
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social order. They often fall within the definition of New Religious Movements, cults, or extreme
beliefs (Bromley 1998; Streib et al., 2011). This aspect is not addressed in this paper.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
The Origin of Stigma Research
In his seminal work, Erving Goffman is one of the first to coin the term “stigma”
(Goffman, 1963). Stigma has its origins in the ancient Greek language, which referred to brands
or marks on the body that were used to expose those who were infamous or disgraced. From the
perspective of culture, stigma serves as a mark or brand on the body that signals socially and
contextually dependent differences. Stigma is reinforced socially through one’s group observing
behavior and interactions with outgroup others, particularly when the outgroup has behaviors or
physical characteristics which indicate their group membership. Further, specific contexts may
also intensify the perception of one’s stigma. For example, an African American male walking
through a white neighborhood might seem more threatening than an African American at the
mall. Goffman notes three indicators of stigma. This first indicator (or mark) consists of physical
attributes such as differences in one’s physical body or skin color. The first indicator can also
include how one dresses or behaves as perceived as deviant beyond what is socially or culturally
normative. A second indicator assumed by outside perceivers is that stigmatized individuals have
deviant attributes. These attributes blemish the individual's character and call into question their
“otherness” or difference from the social or cultural norm. They also signaling some more indepth insight regarding the person such as a variety of psychological disorders, criminal history,
sexuality, or political behavior. The third aspect of stigma is the tribal assumption which assumes
that group members who share the mark also bear similar attributes that are discrediting to the
group as a whole (e.g., skin color, ethnicity, generational associations such as religious
membership or subgroups such as gypsies) all perceived to be shared by the group (Goffman,
1963). These might also include negative behavioral expectations such as aggression or threat or
positive behavioral expectations such as athleticism or scholarly acumen as well. Crocke, Major,
& Steele (1998) summed up these characteristics as “the person is devalued, spoiled or flawed in
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the eyes of others” (p. 504). Goffman’s work served as the foundation for research on stigma.
However, he was by no means the only theorist to explain the psychological implications of
stigma.
Katz (1979) further expounded upon Goffman’s work to suggest four dimensions of
stigma. Those dimensions are visibility, threat, sympathy arousal and hostility (feeling sorry for
the other or disliking the other), and perceived responsibility. Katz defined visibility as the
awareness of difference, which could be a physical mark or outward-facing and signaling
characteristics such as clothing, hairstyle, behavior. The second dimension of Katz’s theory is the
threat that the stigma can signal to others. This assumption is applied to all with the stigmatizing
mark or characteristic. The third dimension is reactive hostility. Hostility can manifest toward
stigmatized individuals in various ways, from physical violence to subversively working against
the stigmatized. The fourth and final dimension is the outsider perception of responsibility. In this
aspect of Katz’s theory, outsiders perceive stigmatized individuals as responsible for their
misfortune.
As Crocker et al. (1998) have asserted, many in-group individuals do not show sympathy
toward outgroup members, while some outgroup members likely compare to other groups to
ensure their status. These comparative experiences probably have detrimental psychological
consequences for the stigmatized, as discussed later (Wright, 1983). Frable (1993) characterized
stigma as marginal in the social landscape where stigmatized individuals or groups are
statistically unusual from social norms yet these characteristics are centrally defining. Bos, Pryor,
Reeder, & Stutterheim (2013) suggested a series of domains in which stigmatization exists where
individual and group identity are much more tied to stigmatizing outcomes. Bos et al. (2013)
characterize stigma as having four potential manifestations. Those four types of stigma are
structural stigma (institutionalized stigma), public stigma (social awareness of stigma), stigma by
association (one’s relationship to the group), and self-stigma (how one sees oneself as signaling
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or confirming stereotypical behaviors of a particular stigma). Simply, stigma signals differences,
and by extension, stigmatizers expect specific behaviors related to the stigmatized’s group. Those
with public awareness of stigma may avoid contexts where others recognize their sigma. Some
who experience stigma by association may seek to distance themselves from others with a similar
stigma to show their “exceptionalism” and capitalize on how they diverge from that identity.
Stigma appears to be cross-cultural. However, there are variations in how stigma is applied to
low-status groups (e.g., religion, physical attributes such as skin color or ethnicity, or social
outgroups such as gypsies). What is a consistent is the function stigma plays for behavioral
expectancy and conversely the behavioral outcomes of those stigmas on the stigmatized (Croker
et al., 1998)? Based on the type of stigma individuals experience, they likely have created
methods for overcoming such types of stigma. For example, those who experience structural
stigma sometimes believe they cannot change their situation, so they distance themselves from
those institutions (e.g., African American boys disidentifying with school, evangelicals
dissociating with mainstream denominations) (Steele & Aronson, 1995).
By contrast, when considering the stigmatizer, a question emerges: What drives highstatus individuals' discriminatory attitudes and behavior? To examine this behavior, we turn to
one of the most influential theorists within prejudice and discrimination research, Gordon Allport
(Katz, 1991). Allport proposed the least effort principle theory. The least effort principle suggests
that people seek to make quick and effort-free judgments regarding others, mainly when the other
appears different from the norm. The assertion is that social norms are code for one’s status,
meaning that any difference from the high-status group can signal outgroup membership. Driven
by stereotypes, those who signal differences can be deemed deviant and treated differently from
the “norm.” They are continually and regularly reminded of their differences (Allport, 1954).
Examples include discrimination in employee selection (Byrne & Nelson 1965; Fischer, Fischer,
Arydin, & Frey, 2010) and classroom instruction preference for white children over minorities
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(Steele, Spencer, Davies, Harber, & Nisbett, 2001; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson 2002). The least
effort principle is convenient in that it allows people to make quick and adaptive decisions. Such
automatic judgments on the part of high-status groups, as well as the experience of stigma, could
not only be learned behaviors but rather an adaptive quality inherent to human social evolution.
Some evidence suggests there may be an evolutionary component.

Is Stigma Adaptive?
From the perspective of evolution, stigma and the least effort principle may have been
adaptive. When ancient humans were tribal, outward appearances might have served as signals
when coming into contact with outgroup others or those perceived as different from tribal norms.
Physical features such as larger and broader shoulders, facial or skin differences, and tribal
symbols such as garb may have signaled potential threat or threatening dispositional
characteristics between groups (Peterson & Wrangham, 1997; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Tooby
& Cosmides, 1992). An interpretation of this type of perception is the least effort principle. The
least effort principle could not only automatically signal intergroup differences quickly but also,
by extension, potential intergroup threat. Regarding evolutionary cognition, Gutherie (2002) has
argued that anthropomorphism serves as a function for human cognition in finding patterns in
environments, including expecting other’s behavior quickly based on their outward appearance.
This includes inter-human social interactions and ensuring one’s continued survival. Further,
Boyer (2002) suggests that such fast distinctions and hypersensitivity to possible dangers give
some humans a competitive advantage over other humans who may not be as sensitive to
heuristics of potential dangers, either animal or human (also termed environmental agents).
An example of a perception of threat is the Smoke Detector Principle. In the Smoke
Detector Principle, the costs of over-detecting threats are less than under-detecting threats (Nesse,
2001). However, as Nesse (2001; 2015) noted, this principle has potential detrimental
consequences to the organism. Such fast judgments could cause individuals to react to threats
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without careful consideration of the other’s intention. Conversely, the smoke detector principle
can also be problematic when an individual is confronted with a real threat but discount the risk
due to others being like them in some way (Nesse, 2005; Schaller, & Duncan, 2007). Hoehl,
Hellmer, Johansson, and Gredebäck (2017) have demonstrated that humans may have an innate
awareness of common threats such as serpents, indicating humans are automatically aware of
such dangers. Such mechanisms may also serve to protect human beings from differences among
people as well. Simply, such automatic judgments and behaviors could ensure the greater
statistical probability of survival and, by extension, relative reproductive fitness (Humphrey,
1976; Caporael & Baron, 1997; Gigerenzer, 1997; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012; Kurzban and
Leary, 2001).
What social benefit does stigma play across cultures? As an example, and from the
within-group perspective, cultures have spoken and unspoken rules related to norms. Since
perceived differences have the potential to be stigma, the rules may vary depending on the type of
differences one is viewed to have. The assertion I would make here is that when someone was
considered different enough, they likely had to supplicate to high status to ensure their
participation within the group. One’s awareness of how the rules are applied to high versus lowstatus individuals likely gave them an adaptive edge over others with a similar stigma who lacked
the expected behaviors. High-status individuals likely collectively monitored those who were
different. Much of the shared attention on outgroup others’ behavior likely also ensured
behavioral compliance with social expectations (Mundy, 2017; Shteynberg, & Apfelbaum, 2013;
Shteynberg, 2010). As a result of these social norms, behavior likely became more coordinated
within groups, resulting in the domestication of food and resources and a higher chance of groups
surviving (Zeder, 2015). Stigma from the within-group context might have served to remind
others of their duty to follow the tribal or kinship rules. In other words, within one’s tribal unit or
kin, stigmatized individuals had to be aware and attend to exchanges of resources in trade
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(Trivers, 1971; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Phelan et al., 1997; Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000).
Some may have conformed to social norms by changing behavior, concealing their stigma if
possible, and hiding marks such as clothing. For other stigmatized individuals, more permanent
marks may have been difficult to conceal, requiring other adaptive behaviors in dealing with
others.
While stigma may have served to control individuals perceived as different within the
group, what about between-group differences? Stigma was likely pertinent to between-group
exchanges as well where one’s tribal group likely lacked the warriors or technology to defend
against another group should the exchange of goods violate intergroup fairness or if a group is
perceived as threatening (Haselton, Buss, & DeKay, 1998; Haselton & Buss, 2000). Therefore,
those without the ability to defend themselves likely had to yield and adapt to new social realities
such as the enslavement of a group to aligning one’s group with another to ensure their continued
survival. In either case, the low status or outgroup was likely hyper-aware of their behavior in
negotiating exchanges. Such exchanges between groups likely ensured the survival of one’s
group, mainly if that outgroup saw themselves as having lower status. In other words, people
monitor their exchanges, providing their own familial and/or group-level reproductive (inclusive)
fitness.
As is pertinent to this research, the question of stigma as defined by Crocker et al. (1998),
as “some attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular
social context” as related to high versus low-status groups is not in question (p. 505), but rather,
what is the experience of believing one’s self or group to be stigmatized (i.e., subjective or
perceived stigma) and what are the consequences of one feeling stigmatized depending on
whether one is high or low in social status? Resource availability to a group likely gives that
group higher transactional power and can influence others. Differences between groups likely
signaled their access to resources and, by extension, how much power one’s group has.
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As an example of such awareness of group resource differences, Relative Deprivation
Theory describes the appraisal of one’s group’s access to resources compared with others
(Crosby, 1984). If a person wishes to engage in transactions with other groups, they are likely
aware of those group differences related to each group’s access to resources. Threat can simply
be one’s group’s awareness and monitoring of their access to resources or the symbolic threat to
cultural conventions and traditional norms within one’s society. Such concerns with cultural
threats are particularly salient when groups enjoy high status and are concerned about losing such
status (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Such a loss could be perceived in various ways,
including the experience of stigma at an individual or group level or concern for one’s individual
or group station in the social hierarchy (the details of this theory’s applicability are discussed
later).
Considering these various themes discussed, one theoretical possibility to explain
stigmatization comes from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. In this perspective,
environmental stimuli or, in this case, the perception of one’s membership in a stigmatized group,
could facilitate activation of phylogenetic behaviors that have their origins in ancient human
social norms and intergroup relations. In other words, we are simply actors triggered by social
experience and repeat similar behaviors found in our early human ancestry when we believe we
are being pushed to the group's fringe and lack the influence and resources to respond to
adversity. These behaviors might be automatic and yet adaptive. For example, behaviors such as
sadness, self-esteem buffering, resource monitoring, fairness, and shared attention likely served to
give our ancestors greater potential fitness for survival even when those ancestors lacked qualities
seen as beneficial or optimal to the group.
In terms of human evolutionary theory, two distinct paths of inheritance exist. One is
genetic with linear changes in lineage occur passed through genes from parent to offspring with
variability in expression at the organism level. In other words, genetic adaptations are passed on
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through generations. Another method of inheritance manifests through cultural and social
learning through social networking with others within a community (Richarson, Boyd, &Henrich,
2010). In this case, cultural variation may provide fast adaptations to environmental stimuli
through collective learning and social adaption. Genetic adaptations have the potential to be much
slower in change. In this regard, what might have been classically seen as error or genetic drift
could be explained in terms of cultural adaptions beyond simply the genetic influence (Findlay,
Hansell, & Lumsden, 1989). In other words, cultural information transmission support more
complex modes of delivery of information between humans where genetic transmission requires
the presence of gene expression between related others (Ross, Richardson, & Rogers, 2013;
Henrich & Boyd, 2002).
From a practical perspective, this infers humans have some potential benefits from
cultural and social learning. Yet, cultural learning is less about randomly adaption and availability
of information and behaviors which may influence gene expression beyond simple environmental
pressures. In other words, humans can use their social networks to influence gene expression by
altering their environment. As noted by Azumagakito, Suzuki, and Arita (2013), such social
adaptations have larger impact on phenotype plasticity. This includes complex language
processing, diet (or tolerance toward certain food such as lactase), and cultural knowledge of
harvesting seasons and agriculture. These social adaptations provided opportunity for widespread
migration, clothing development, societal development, and technological innovation. As a result,
humans adapted to wider dietary tolerances, environmental temperature changes, collective
survival, and eventual complex social order (Richerson, Boyd, Henrich, 2010).
Applying this same framework to stigma, it could be that stigma served as a method for
ensuring cultural cohesion where those who were different might have either capitalized on the
differences while others might have sought to appear as close to the cultural prototype of normal.
For those with physical attribute which differed substantially from the protype of normal, may
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have used their differences to achieve status by appearing threatening as a method of protecting
themselves. Early outgroup members may have needed to socially adapt to survive through
submission to early authority accepting their outward differences, and therefore yielding power to
others to avoid death or exile. In other words, outgroup members had a greater chance of survival
living as an outsider, then on their own. So they may accept stigmatization to ensure greater
reproductive fitness than being on their own.
Through the advent of globalization and secularization, humans are now more frequently
in contact with diverse groups of people with changing social status related to migration and birth
rates of minority groups. These changes result in a new age of inter-human interaction. Social and
cultural plurality creates the environment for complex and diverse social interactions unseen in
human history with a plethora of different kinds of people. Indeed, there is sociological as well as
psychological evidence of competition for resources within intergroup relations. While these
resources may have become more complex (social status, power, social capital, access to
education), they still represent similar interpersonal dynamics that may have existed for
thousands of years. Therefore, there may be a relationship between one’s loss of status and
perception of stigma and one’s perception of losing resources and power. However, this premise
does not address the potential psychological outcomes of one’s perception of loss of status. The
following section discusses these in more detail.

Identity, Stigma, and Self-Esteem
To measure stigma alone does not address the complexity of the potential emotions, attitudes, and
behaviors. Rather, there are likely a variety of correlations which may differ between high- versus
low-status groups. Identity is powerful regarding cultural symbolism and social expectation. In
other words, how we identify with others is value-laden and essential to our well-being and social
status. To be stigmatized is to lose one’s potential social power. When one is stigmatized, various
outcomes can be detrimental to groups and/or individuals. Since public or group stigma is rooted
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in cultural normativity, stigmatizing behaviors can be consistent and even normative within
society. Some of these outcomes include loss of resources, fear of intergroup competition for
resources, buffering of self-esteem, intergroup prejudice, and situational framing effects. Poor
performance is explained through their institutional or social stigma, not their ability. This section
reviews some of the literature related to the experience of being stigmatized.
One central aspect of stigma is the role identity plays in connecting the individual with
group identity. Individuals derive meaning from their membership in various groups and engage
others based on their perceived group membership. In some cases, these identities are highly
salient between groups and can include either positive or negative appraisals of differing others.
Knowles and Peng (2005) demonstrated that white racial identity is automatically associated with
the self and in-group evaluations and intergroup bias. The authors showed how identity extends
from one’s group to the self in making group-level categorizations in their four studies. Knowles
and Peng (2005) showed that these categorizations also included a negative emotional appraisal
of the self, based on the acts of their group when presented with information regarding
transgressions toward outgroups such as the lynching of African Americans. Further, when
comparing one’s group to others, those with strong group identity may fear the encroachment of
other groups as they may create ambiguity regarding group differences. Rubin & Paolini (2014)
demonstrated that such encroachment is not only threatening but considered polluting of the
group's perceived positive attributes (in other words, contamination of purity). From an applied
research perspective, intergroup appraisals could also impact public policy, particularly when
such groups perceive other groups as potentially threatening (Knowles and Peng, 2005; Phinney,
1990).
Stigmatized individuals may utilize various strategies that make their identity not readily
apparent to outsiders. Those situations where one’s membership in a group is ambiguous to others
may use multiple methods to hide their group identity. Kang, DeCelles, Tilcsik, and Jun (2016)
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interviewed 29 black and 30 Asian university students seeking employment. Over 36% of
interviewees reported whiting (removing language that indicates they are a minority) or changing
the information on their resume to be more marketable. In the second study, the researchers asked
participants to review job descriptions and adapt their resumes based on the descriptions.
Interviewees applying to employers with an equal opportunity statement were less likely to
modify their resumes than those applying to employers without the statement. Furthermore, in
study three, researchers sent resumes with various levels of whiting to determine the number of
real callbacks from employers. They found that whitened resumes received more callbacks than
those resumes with wording that signaled the applicant might be a minority. These studies
provide evidence that bias against minority groups does appear to exist in resume evaluations.
Once in a job, one’s perception of stigma could create a hypersensitivity to their work
performance, expectancy for behavior (e.g., laziness, attendance, adversarial exchanges), and
even termination (which is typical for LGBTQQ), all resulting in employees being guarded
regarding their identity (Woods, 1994). Such experiences have led many with concealed identities
to withhold their identity from others who perceived themselves as better off (Jones et al., 1984).
These coping mechanisms result in very calculated behavior and dyadic exchanges with fellow
employees (Frable, Blackston, and Sherbaum, 1990). It is unclear if those in high-status groups
perceive themselves to experience similar biases related to their identity and if so, respond in
analogous ways.
An example might be a person who has the early stages of cancer. To ensure their
continued employment, they may seek to withhold information regarding their medical condition
from their employer to avoid layoffs or loss of insurance (Byrne & Nelson 1965; Solanka, L.,
2017; Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990). Alternatively, being identified as a criminal or
social delinquent may push an individual to conform to high-status norms or, in some cases,
embrace such outgroup stereotyped identities (an example would be a someone who is gay
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concealing their identity). This social influence may not be simply from the justice system's
perspective but rather the social influences of the media, culture, friends, and family represent.
For example, an individual who has grown up within a low socio-economic community with a
high crime rate and high unemployment may choose to capitalize on their situation and embrace a
life of crime as a means of feeling accepted among their peers and a means of gaining power.
More simply, some stigmatized individuals may find themselves reinforcing high-status group
stereotypes of low-status groups by exhibiting perceived expected deviant behavior such as
criminal activity. From the psychological perspective, they incorporate their stereotype by acting
out the expected behavior of their group. Their behaviors further reinforce negative group
stereotypes at the group level even when such behaviors are present in high-status groups (Perry,
Dovidio, Murphy, & van Ryn, 2015). Alternatively, those stigmatized may be aware of outsider
perceptions of their group identity and work to show they do not conform to such social
conventions or behavioral expectations. In some cases, identity can be concealed, while in others,
where one’s identity is apparent, adapting to one’s stigma may require alternative coping
methods.
Disengagement is when a stigmatized individual disengages their self-esteem from their
performance, accepting that their situation is based on stigma, not one’s actual ability (Major,
Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998). For many high school students, their GPA
becomes a source of pride or anxiety as performance is generally seen as attributional versus
situationally dependent. Steele and Aronson (1995) suggested that, particularly for blacks
(characteristically visible stigma), their disengagement with school serves as a coping or
buffering strategy to distance themselves from confirming negative stereotypes and, by extension,
high-status rules and social expectations. These studies suggest the adaptive quality cultivated by
low-status groups for addressing long-standing prejudice and stigmatization through
institutionalized bias and discrimination due to stigma. Alternatively, another approach is
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through disidentification. The individual can redefine themselves and their identity so that the
performance in a particular domain is not pertinent to their membership in an identified group. In
the case of African Americans or women, they may seek to more closely identify with the group
to utilize novel ways of addressing negative stereotypes and stigma such as schematic or selfconstrual redefinition through overperforming to prove themselves or adopting adaptive views of
intelligence (von Hippel, Hawkins, & Schooler, 2001). An example would be, an African
American woman and engineer demonstrating she is the exception not the norm from her racial
group.
Another perspective is the distinction between disengagement and disidentification
related to one’s performance with a task and disidentification with one’s identity. As an example
of disengagement, an African American student makes a poor grade on a test. Rather than
internalizing what could be perceived as a failure, they recognize that the school as an institution
is not fair to minorities. Therefore, the student can explain their grade as school-based prejudice.
Recognizing the unfairness of institutions charged with serving these groups, outgroups may
insulate themselves from the adverse psychological outcomes that come with their stigmas, such
as low self-esteem or sadness (Steele et al., 2002). In the case of disidentification, some
stigmatized individuals might seek to normalize their stigma by changing the perceptions of
others. In this approach, the stigmatized individual self-discloses their invisible stigma to others
and then works to show others they are as normal as those in high-status groups. This can cause
them to work harder, positioning themselves to prototype how the stigma associated is false. By
being open regarding their identity, they can attempt to control the social perception of
themselves or their group (Joachim & Acorn, 2000).
The resulting benefits of disclosure management have been noted by Royer (1998) as
emotional wellbeing, alienation management, and changing perceptions of stigma limitations. Of
course, revealing one’s identity is not without cost and likely requires some degree of
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reconnaissance by stigmatized individuals before disclosure. Nevertheless, if they are successful,
there can have even greater self-confidence and self-esteem on the part of the stigmatized,
particularly when they have continued experience with stigma.
Another consideration related to concealment as a protective mechanism of self-esteem is
related to attributional ambiguity. Attributional ambiguity is when a person who identifies with a
low-status group is unsure if feedback related to their behavior is performance based or prejudicebased. That ambiguity is centered on the objective evaluation of one’s ability or membership in a
low-status group. As a result, the individual likely expends many cognitive resources in
presenting themselves as an ingroup member. As a byproduct of these cognitively taxing social
interactions, the individual likely experiences anxiety and stress in determining if the individual
inadvertently signaled their stigma or not. Such exchanges can create emotions for the
stigmatized as there could be many possible explanations for the behavior of others. Even for
those who self-disclose their stigma, they still may not be able to determine if others are genuine
in their exchanges, creating uncertainty (Crocker et al., 1991; Major & Crocker, 1993; Aronson &
Inzlicht, 2004). Attributional ambiguity also need not be applied to the stigmatized. For example,
those with wealth or power could perceive themselves to have attributional ambiguity. When
people are kind to those with wealth, the wealthy are unsure if the kindness is genuine or
motivated to take advantage of their wealth. This example demonstrates that humans regularly
monitor others in an attempt to determine intention (e.g., the theory of mind), and sometimes such
assumptions or appraisals of others are accurate or inaccurate (Astington, 2003). Such
experiences could result in stereotype threat.
Schmader (2002) explored stereotype threat within gender. Stronger gender identity had
an influence on math test scores versus weaker identity. Women for whom gender was central to
their identity performed worse on math-related tasks than those for whom their identity as a
woman was less important (Schmader, 2002). In other words, when a person believes that their
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group membership is predictive of their ability on a particular task, they perform more poorly
when they closely identify with that group. Such group attributions can also be manipulated
positively as well. Oyserman, Harrison, and Bybee (2001) found that young African American
girls who believed that African American girls were highly proficient in achievement had the
highest achievement efficacy compared with other groups. This finding further supported the
assertion that people draw individual attributional information from those groups for whom they
identify most closely and those assertions influence self-esteem. A similar pattern emerges
related to religion and faith. Particularly, Rios et al. (2016) explored if differences in task-based
performance would exist when the research participant’s Christian identity was made salient.
Self-described Christians performed more poorly on tasks framed as science-based than tasks
framed as intuition-based when their identity was made salient. In other words, if their Christian
identity was made apparent, they are more likely to do poorly on science based task versus those
whose Christian identity was not made apparent. While they may not endorse such stereotypes
about themselves or their group, such assumptions seemed to influence their performance on
scientifically framed tasks across multiple studies (Rios et al., 2016).
Crosby (1984) asserts that shared perception is likely one of the main drivers of the
experience of stigma and discrimination from the perspective of one’s experience. Based on their
observation of others within their group, these assumptions cause them to deduce shared
experiences indicative of the group’s overall stigma. Crosby's research is of particular interest
because some individuals have not experienced personal stigma as members of the group, but
have either heard about it via hearsay or have observed it occurring with others in their group.
This research shows that identifying with others who have perceived themselves to be stigmatized
affects one’s perception of stigma. The high salience of one’s group membership can influence
their perception of their group in the broader social hierarchy (Crosby, 1984). From this
perspective, perceived stigma can potentially vary from individual to group level, and one’s
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perception of the treatment of their group may or may not be reinforced by their particular
experience (if they have experienced stigma, personally). However, their personal experience of
stigma may reaffirm their group identity. To this end, this section discusses the individual’s
motives and behavior in reacting to individual stigma and the potentially detrimental
consequences of being identified as part of a stigmatized group. Some who have long experienced
stigma may have various coping strategies, while those new to sigma may not be prepared for the
psychological consequences.
Bos et al. (2013) proposed four types of stigma: structural stigma, public stigma, stigma
by association, and self-stigma. Of particular interest here are the differences between stigma by
association and self-stigma. One’s experience of stigma can be not only at the group level but as
an individual member of the group. While one may not have personal experiences of stigma, they
may know of others who have experienced stigma and therefore are sensitive to being categorized
as a member of the same group. Conversely, if one sees themselves within a stigmatized group,
they may have developed personal coping strategies to recognize and adapt to their group’s
perceived limitations. Examples of such coping mechanisms are reflected within the just-world
hypothesis as believing at some point perpetrators will receive punishment, experiential
compartmentation where one’s opinions are sectioned off without drawing connections to related
experiences, psychological disengagement where one detaches their self-esteem from a
stigmatizing context, or system justification (Crosby, 1984; Shin, Dovidio, & Napier, 2013,
Schmader, Major, Gramzow, 2001, Jost and Banaji, 1994). Even when a group believes
themselves to be stigmatized, they may still benefit at some level from the social hierarchy. Of
particular interest here is Jost and Banaji's (1994) System Justification Theory, where individuals
believe that while the institution works against low-status groups, there is a belief that such
institutions are necessary even natural (status quo). For Jost and Banaji (1994), interpersonal
identity is similar to ego justification, where one seeks to project themselves as positive and
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favorable as part of the larger group narrative. This is known as “group justification,” where one
needs to feel positive about themselves extends to the group. When the self or the group's motives
exceed system justification, individuals question or challenge the social system.
One of the earliest assumptions of empirical research on stigma and self-esteem was that
stigma was detrimental to the stigmatized, decreasing self-esteem or performance. This
hypothesis failed to gain support (Crocker and Major, 1989), particularly with visible and nonconcealable physical deformities (Clifford and Clifford, 1986), Obesity (Jarvie et al. 1983), or
physical attractiveness (Brzezicki & Major, 1983). It appears that stigmatized individuals have
various strategies for dealing with stigma, and resulting success can empower individuals with
higher positive self-esteem versus self-esteem loss. Crocker and Major (1989) note that empirical
evidence cannot confirm the linkage between stigma and self-esteem. For example, Hoelter
(1982) observed no significant differences in the Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale between Whites
and African Americans or between males versus females by determining perimeter estimates
through SEM. One possible explanation could also be that such feelings are suppressed and not
self-reported. At the group level, stigma can result in blaming high-status groups for the cause of
one’s suffering (Crocker & Major, 1989). Crocker (1999) noted that group perception creates
shared reality, reinforcing devaluation and stereotypes of outgroups. Such devaluation can serve
to remind targets of their stigma (Frable, 1993). However, given that stigma can be systematic
and pervasive, stigmatized individuals may create coping strategies to address their experiences
of stigma, mainly where such experiences are widespread. Simply, prejudice and, by experience,
stigma keep low-status individuals from participating fully in society, and yet the stigmatized
demonstrate self-protective attitudes and behaviors adaptive to their situation. This also leads to
another question of how high-status individuals become a social prototype of normality for which
any variation in identity is identified as different.
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Danbold and Huo (2015) suggest that whites serve as a prototype ethnic group within the
United States. They are generally the social reference group when other groups are perceived as
different. High-Status individuals typically enjoy their position in the social hierarchy through
social power and privilege (prototypical status). Unfortunately, social hierarchies can change, and
those who have experienced high status can perceive themselves to lose influence. The result can
be fear and intergroup threat. The authors call this perceived loss of their group status
Prototypicality Threat. As part of their study one, Danbold and Huo (2015) recruited 149 white
Americans (both male and female). They completed a series of modified questions related to
support for assimilation, prototypical threat, realistic threat, and symbolic threat. They found that
concerns with change of status mediated whites' concern about their continued prototypical status.
The authors in their study two observed that when presented with false data showing loss of
majority status, whites become more defensive of their group and higher on prototypicality threat
and lower on diversity endorsement. Further, whites are less likely to see outgroups as
prototypically American (Danbold and Huo, 2015). This current study will replicate the
manipulation (loss of status) of the Danbold and Huo (2015) study to determine if white males or
Christians would react to a perceived loss of status. It is unclear how high-status individuals with
no experience in insulating themselves from stigmatizing events would cope with these
experiences and what impact such perceived stigma would have on their self-esteem and
intergroup emotions. Based on the literature reviewed here, it is more likely that those who have
generally enjoyed power and status will likely lack the coping and behavioral modification
strategies for dealing with stigma compared to their low-status counterparts. Those who can
conceal their identity may choose to do so, while those who cannot may experience loss of selfesteem.
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Stigma and Intergroup Emotion
Social psychologists have long been interested in intergroup prejudice and stigma, and by
extension, intergroup emotions. Prejudice has various emotional correlations, including contempt,
anxiety, fear, disgust, and sadness (Smith & Mackie, 2018; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Individual
emotions are also present at the group level. However, these basic emotions frame between-group
attitudes. Regarding fear and disgust, ingroups may avoid other groups, while contempt and anger
might influence aggressive actions against other groups. According to Mackie, Devos, & Smith
(2000), participants with higher reported anger were more likely to make between-group
appraisals regarding intergroup differences. Further, those higher on reported anger would be
more likely and willing to confront outgroup members. Also, the emotions experienced by the ingroup influence their level of interest in conflict with the outgroup. In other words, emotions
serve as a functional mechanism to provide appraisals of others as well as context and
experiences (Maitner, Claypool, Mackie, & Smith, 2008; Smith & Mackie, 2018). Mackie,
Devos, and Smith (2000) suggest that group-level identification and appraisals are driven by
social comparisons of the self, the individual’s group, as compared with other groups. Emotions
provide evaluative feedback about the perceived status and comparison of one’s group with
others. Shared experience and identity with others likely enhance their feelings regarding their
group self-appraisals. Further research has also shown that emotional states also vary as a
function of different group memberships. (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Seger,
Smith, & Mackie, 2009; Ray, Mackie, Rydell, & Smith 2008; E. R. Smith et al., 2007). Group
level emotion also appears to be linked to group motivation, suggesting that some groups vary in
collective motivation compared with other groups with different shared emotions. (Reyson &
Branscombe, 2008). Further, Smith (1993) observed that stereotypes and prejudice could vary
from how liked the outgroup is, even when that group is perceived to have positive attributes. In
some cases, the outgroup may be seen to have positive attributes such as the stereotype of being a
hard worker (e.g., Mexican immigrants) or having scholarly prowess (e.g., Asian students).
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However, discriminating behaviors can exist just the same (e.g., fear of immigrants taking one’s
job or the assumption that Asians are always good at taking tests and therefore taking
scholarships from whites).
In sum, it is group-level appraisals and comparison that can influence the emotion and
motivation of the individual. Simply, emotions can bind individuals closer to their groups and can
serve as potential functional indicators among group members. Observing others who share group
membership can reinforce attitudes regarding other outgroup experiences of contact and conflict.
Sadness could communicate a group or individual’s inability or lack of power to confront highstatus groups. At the same time, anger is a means for demonstrating that one has had successful
conflict outcomes. Shared goals and/or perceived threat may heighten or damper one’s concern
for their group. Further, those comparisons can also create concern for other groups. For example,
those who are sympathetic to stigmatized individuals will show more emotional compassion. In
contrast, those who fear or avoid stigmatized individuals may show more anger and act on such
anger. In some cases, outgroups may exhibit emotional ambivalence (Dijker & Koomen, 2003).
For those individuals whose stigma is perceived as dangerous, outgroups may elicit fear or
avoidance not only from high-status individuals but even fellow group members (Bos, Kok, &
Dijker, 2001; Feldman & Crandall, 2007).
Finally, one topic of particular interest here is related to intergroup conflict. As a
demonstration of Smith’s theory (noted earlier in this section), Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000)
suggested that when individuals face an adverse event in their lives such as intergroup conflict,
how they react to such conflict is dependent upon what resources or means they have to withstand
conflict. Suppose the group generally succeeds in competition. In that case, they are likely to
confront similar conflicts in the future, where if the group fails, then the group may avoid conflict
in the future. Within this model, confronting outgroups in conflict is associated with higher anger,
while avoidance is associated with sadness. Confrontation versus avoidance is a product of how
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much collective support the group enjoys. Mackie et al. (2000) also demonstrated that anger
could serve as a mediator in confronting outgroups and thus can be manipulated while sadness
and defensiveness remain similar with no change in the confrontation. In other words, anger
could provide the mechanism to energize and mobilize groups to action. At the same time,
sadness serves to push groups and individuals to avoid adverse conditions in the sense of
avoidance. More simply, intergroup emotions are the product of perceived intergroup relations
within the broader social landscape, providing feedback within and between groups.
This section has discussed the intersections between the individual’s emotional,
attitudinal, and behavioral domains from intergroup interactions. Outgroups may exhibit
emotional ambivalence when they are aware of their status as an outgroup member. For those
individuals whose stigma is perceived as dangerous, ingroups and outgroups may elicit fear or
avoidance of the stigmatized (Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Bos, Kok, & Dijker, 2001; Feldman &
Crandall, 2007). Based on these findings, high-status individuals have likely enjoyed successful
outcomes in intergroup conflict in the past. They would likely experience higher anger at the loss
of status as opposed to sadness. However, if one’s perception of sigma is similar to that of lowstatus groups, they may experience higher sadness, as demonstrated by previous studies on stigma
and emotion.

Relative Deprivation Theory and Intergroup Prejudice
The differences between in-groups and outgroups are not simply prejudiced or stigma
inherent to the individual but also include the power dynamics between these groups, and, by
extension, access to resources by outgroups when controlled by ingroups. This is relative
deprivation theory. More formally, relative deprivation theory proposes that individuals monitor
their group’s access to resources. When these individuals perceive they have a disadvantage, they
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experience anger and resentment and believe themselves entitled to receive similar benefits. For
these individuals, they seek fairness and equity of resources. Smith et al. (2012) proposed that
relative deprivation theory has four components. First, people compare themselves to others.
Second, they form cognitive appraisals and opinions regarding if they or their group is
disadvantaged. Third, individuals believe that being disadvantaged is unfair. Finally, individuals
hold negative feelings and resent their disadvantages. Both the fields of psychology and sociology
have extensive research on relative deprivation theory since the 1950s.
Keltner et al. (2003) suggested that power gives individuals the ability and potential
capacity to modify the internal states of others. Inherent in Keltner et al.’s model is the regular
reminder of resource differences. Particularly for the powerless, these reminders ensure
conformity to dominant norms based on need and access, not a person’s motivation to change
behavior or their ability to make decisions for themselves. Further, Keltner and colleagues
suggest that powerlessness profoundly influences one’s threat sensitivity, behavior, and automatic
responses. Comparatively, having little to no power negatively impacts one’s emotional state,
influences the way low-status individuals focus on individual or group goals and alter their
normal behavior (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1988; Gruenfeld, 1995; Sutton
& Davidson, 1997).
An awareness of their lack of power or status could make people more sensitive to any
stimuli which might highlight their membership in their group, which in turn could result in some
level of behavior or affective outcomes such as anxiety, avoidance, response inhibition, and
environmental vigilance (being aware of others responses and behavior). This could cause
cognitive load, and perceived unusual behavior from the perception of others (Buss, 1996; Gray,
1987, 1991; Higgins, 1997, 1998). Also, rather than considering power as dichotomous (such as
the power or powerless), it varies by degrees, where different groups hold different types of
power. Depending on one’s status, they may have more or less power. For example, the
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connection between low power and negative affect has also been demonstrated among children of
low socioeconomic status. Children were observed to exhibit depression, negatively sustained
moods, and guilt, all varying by age and various stigmatizing identities (Dovidio et al., 1988;
Hecht, Inderbitzen, & Bukowski, 1998). The research provided above demonstrates that there is
plenty of research that has been conducted on low-status outcomes of stigma and discrimination.
Nevertheless, there is little literature exploring outcomes of perceived stigma or prejudice among
the high status. While cultural examples exist where smaller groups hold power over larger
groups (e.g., Sunni Muslims in Iraq have the political power while Shia Muslims make up the
majority), high status is associated with majority status in the American context. Moreover,
access to resources is a primary concern for various groups in a diverse society. This might be
particularly problematic for someone who feels stigmatized and yet has also enjoyed resource
access in the past. Their perception could be based on seeing their group lose their influence in
power loss, social status, resource access, or group representation within the larger society. Based
on the premises of the previous sections, I proposed a study that examined the influence of
perceived loss of status on a perception of sigma, intergroup emotion, particularly sadness or
anger, self-esteem, and perception of power. The following section provides further detail in
outlining the research design.

Research Questions
As suggested earlier in the introduction, the term stigma has been used by some highstatus individuals to self-characterize their experiences. Still, is the use of the term “stigma”
appropriate given it has generally been applied to low-status groups? This is not to say that
individuals may not experience some form of adversity. However, many individuals who fit the
definition of high status also claim to be stigmatized. While this is a simple research question,
there are some potential variables to consider in light of the academic literature.
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Experience of stigma can vary from individual to the group level. For example, one may
not have a direct experience of stigma and yet is aware of the experiences of others in their group.
For some, their experiences only further confirm their membership within the group. Therefore,
this study examined the role of stigma at the group and individual levels.
Two types of identity also provide an interesting discussion. One example is of those
identities which are difficult to conceal, and the other example is of identities that can be
concealed. For instance, for white males, their identity is physically apparent, given the color of
their skin, hairstyle, etc . Because this particular identity could be perceived as high status, they
might view diversity initiatives as working against them. Depending on one’s perception, they
may see this experience as socially empowering or discriminating.
For Christians, they can conceal their religious identity, assuming they understand the
social norms and expectations. For example, Christians in an academic context may be aware of
diversity language and science terminology and speak to their colleagues within those domains. If
Christians self-disclose or are outed, they may be concerned about their authenticity as an
academic or scholar. As an example, Gartner (1986) sent fake resumes to a variety of clinical
psychology programs. Those resumes which were open regarding their Christian beliefs were less
likely to be chosen than those who made no mention of religious beliefs.
While Christians serve as the most significant religious identity within the United States,
some social domains could certainly place traditional Christians in being perceived as an
outgroup. Academia is an excellent example. In 2010, Inside Higher Ed ran an article discussing
Christian experiences in academia from students and faculty, suggesting there may be prejudice
against believers in academia (Larsen, 2010). Even the popular movie series “God’s Not Dead”
plays off of Frederick Nitzsche's famous declaration of “God is Dead,” adding the term “not” to
indicate that God is still relevant in the modern world. The movies infer those social norms have
turned against Christianity and that we live in an age where belief in God is actively suppressed.
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As presented in the movie series, central to this thesis is that governmental and liberal institutions
are working to destroy individual religious freedoms mocking some Christians' beliefs. Both the
correlational and culturally anecdotal evidence point to a belief that Christians believe they
experience discrimination.
Threat can take various forms; in one example, how high-status groups exhibit their
influence can be threatening to low status groups should they lack agency to determine group
level outcomes. In another example, it can be access to the dissemination of resources between
groups. Based on these premises, it could be concluded that high-status individuals perceive
detrimental social exchanges as related to their membership in a particular group. One possible
example of detrimental exchanges is the perceived loss of power or social status. Loss of social
status can also be the perception of the loss of resources. Therefore, this study will explore how
high-status individuals perceive their group sustaining versus losing status over time due to their
perception of losing majority status.
In predicting possible outcomes such as intergroup emotion, membership can have
psychologically detrimental consequences for those individuals in stigmatized groups.
Conversely, continued stigmatizing experiences can also provide buffering effects for stigmatized
individuals when recognizing the structural stigma inherent within their society. It is unclear if
the perception of stigma by high-status individuals is similar to that of low-status individuals in
buffering their perceived experiences of stigma. Further, those who have had continuing failed
confrontations with others will likely show more sadness. However, those who have had
successful conflicts with outgroups will probably have greater anger. Given the assumption that
high-status individuals have enjoyed privilege, they may have succeeded in confrontations with
outgroups and would likely result in higher anger. Those who have experienced institutionalized
stigma will likely have self-protective strategies in coping with their stigma. Those with little or
no experience with institutional stigma may lack self-protective strategies in coping with their
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perceived stigma. Another perspective is in buffering one’s self-esteem as a result of stigma.
Those with regular experiences of perceived stigma likely have likely developed methods for
buffering these experiences. White males or Christians likely also have relatively little experience
with buffering their self-esteem in regards to stigma. Those who are white cannot conceal their
identity. In contrast, those with a religious identity such as Christianity can hide their identity
given, they can appropriately identify others' perceptions of them and monitor and respond to
others appropriately. Therefore, one potential outcome of managing one’s new role in coping
with a perceived stigma would be reductions in individual self-esteem.
This experimental study explored high-status individuals’ perception of stigma to see if
similar psychological patterns emerge compared with low-status stigmatized individuals. Our
premises suggested two studies be conducted, both online. The first study explored white male
perceived stigma. The second study will examine allegiant Christian perceptions of stigma. These
groups are typically identified as high-status, yet some individuals within each group self-identify
as stigmatized. Given the earlier premise that losing one’s majority status could result in
perceived stigma and/or loss of power, the following hypotheses follow possible outcome
variables with alternative hypotheses compared to the previous research findings. This study
proposed the following hypotheses and provided an alternative hypothesis as a best practice, as
Platt (1964) noted. Each number assigned is the hypothesis number to be tested. These are also
represented in Table 1. with subsequent alternative hypotheses.
1. When white males/Christians are led to believe that their group is losing its numeric
majority, participants will report higher group stigma than those who perceive their group
majority to stay constant.
a. Comparatively, those who perceive their group to lose a numeric majority may
perceive their group also to lose social power but will show no differences in
their perception of their group’s experience of stigma (indicating that the
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perception of one’s changing status is perceived loss of power not the perception
of group stigma).
2. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status,
we expect increased prejudice toward low-status outgroups compared to those who
perceive their group majority to stay constant.
a. Alternatively, those who perceive their group to lose a numeric majority will
experience no significant difference in outgroup prejudice.
3. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric majority status
but where they have likely had hierarchical and social power (were once high status) and,
by extension, have probably enjoyed some successful confrontations with other groups,
we expect higher anger than sadness.
a. As a contrasting hypothesis, if high-status individuals perceive themselves to lose
numeric majority status and where they were thought to hold social power but
believe their group to experience more stigma, they may experience higher
sadness than anger, indicating that sigma has similar outcomes as to those
experienced by low-status groups showing a similar pattern of affective reaction
to stigma.
4. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status,
they will show lower individual self-esteem.
a. Alternatively, those perceiving themselves to lose numeric majority status may
have similar buffering effects to those in low-status groups in protecting their
self-esteem, much like a minority or low-status group.
5. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status, they will
perceive themselves to lose group power.
a. It could also be that those who perceive themselves to lose majority status may
continue to believe they will not lose power.
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6. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status,
they will perceive themselves to lose individual power measured by a measure of
individual power.
a. Contrasting this hypothesis, it could be that those who perceive themselves to
numeric majority status may perceive themselves to continue to hold individual
power.
7. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority status,
they will be more likely to conceal their Christian beliefs (study two).
a. Alternatively, one’s identity as a Christian being socially normative; they are less
likely to conceal their Christian beliefs.
8. To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose `numeric majority status,
they will be less likely to disclose their Christian beliefs to others (study two).
a. Moreover, and in providing an alternative explanation, one’s identity as a
Christian being socially normative will make them more likely to conceal their
Christian beliefs.
9. In exploring possible moderating influences on the various dependent variables list in the
above hypotheses, we are also examining how collective self-esteem and social
dominance orientation may enhance or inhibit the various outcome variables. There are
no formal projected hypotheses here for the moderating effects but rather explorative
research for further insight.
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Table 1 - Hypothesis Predicted Outcomes

Dependent Variable

Loss of
Status Hformal

Loss of Status Same
Halternative
Status

Control

Individual Stigma
Group Stigma
Intergroup Prejudice
Intergroup Sadness
Intergroup Anger
Individual Self-Esteem
Individual Power
Group Power
Concealment (Study
Two)
Disclosure (Study Two)
NC = no change

NC
Increase
Increase
NC
Increase
Decrease
Decrease
NC
Increase

NC
NC
NC
Increase
NC
NC
NC
Decrease
NC

NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC

NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC

Decrease

NC

NC

NC
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology
The following two studies explored high-status stigma. The first study examined white
males, manipulating their perceived numeric majority status, either maintaining information
regarding majority status or losing majority status over time. By manipulating perceived status,
one's group perceives that one’s group will be perceived as losing status as a function of a false
report by condition. The second study replicated the methodological conditions, manipulations,
and process of the first study that Christians served as the focus of the research, particularly
traditional Christians. The latter fits the allegiant paradigm, as noted by Bromley (1998). In
Bromley’s theory, Allegiant individuals are normative dominations within a particular
community (considered the major denominations). In addressing the role of concealment within
Christianity, we employed two scales adapted from the LGBTQQ literature, the first scale related
to concealment and the second related to disclosure (Jackson, & Mohr, 2016; Mohr & Fassinger
2000). For study two, the Christian participants also responded to questionnaires related to
identity concealment (hiding one’s identity from others) and disclosure (sharing of one’s identity
with others). The manipulation in both studies presents a percentage of group membership (either
as white males or Christians) within the broader American context, either as holding steady or
losing representation. This serves as manipulation of group status. Both studies examined if any
moderating variables may contribute to an enhanced effect on perceived stigma and the resulting
dependent variables (in this case, emotion and intergroup prejudice). Those potential moderating
variables included the percentage of group membership, Social Dominance Orientation, and
collective self-esteem. This design tested the before-mentioned hypotheses, as shown in Figure 1.
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Low versus high
Collective Self-Esteem,
Social Dominance
Orientation
White or Christian
Identification

Independent Variable
Change in perception of
majority status
(manipulated)

Dependent Variables
Individualized Stigma
Group Stigma
Intergroup Prejudice
Emotion
Individual Self-Esteem
Individual Power
Group Power
Concealment (Christians Only)
Disclosure (Christians Only)

Figure 1 - Status-Based Stigma Research Conceptual Framework
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Study One
Sample
As part of study one, we attempted to manipulate one's perceived majority status within American
society as a white male, an apparent identity that is difficult to conceal. Data were collected from
two sources. The first was collected through TurkPrime, a crowdsourced research participant
platform. The second was collected through purposeful snowball sampling of self-identified white
males via social media (Facebook and Twitter). A total of 246 participants were recruited via
TurkPrime and 125 from social media for 371 total participants. In terms of demographics,
participants were white male Americans. Combining the overall samples into a single study, the
average mean age was 40, with a standard deviation of 13.23. The ages ranged from 18 to 85. The
participants reported taking some college courses (n=111 or 30%). In comparison, others reported
receiving a bachelor's degree (n=152 or 41%), and some reported completing a graduate or
professional degree (n=73 or 19.7%). In terms of marital status, the largest reported groups were
either never married (n=158 or 42.6%) or married (n=171 or 46.1%). Further, most participants
identified as either an Atheist or Agnostic (n=171 or 46.1%) or Christian (n=147 or 39.6%). The
demographics are similar to other convenience sample studies except for the self-reported
religiosity, with a disproportionate number of atheists or agnostics participating. In terms of selfreported political affiliation, the most substantial majority of participants identified as a Democrat
(n=170 or 45.8%) while the rest of the participants identified as a Republican (n=96 or 25.9%) or
Libertarian (n=57 or 15.4%).

Procedure
White male participants were presented with an online survey utilizing Qualtrics through online
solicitation via the TurkPrime research participant system and social media recruitment. Informed
consents were provided digitally within Qualtrics, an online survey system including a
description of the method with statements like “this survey is based on your attitudes toward
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various world issues,” as well as a typical timeframe of completion and standard consent
language informing the potential participant of their rights by participating in this study.
Participants were able to download a PDF copy of the informed consent for their records
following the end of the study. Further, participants were debriefed regarding the nature of the
study, including the full disclosure of the research question posed and methods. All data and
information were contained in an encrypted password folder. This study employed three
conditions where two of the three conditions for each level serve as manipulations. Beginning the
study, all participants completed measures related to demographics, Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO), and Collective Self-Esteem with SDO and Collective Self-Esteem randomly
presented. Following these measures, participants were randomly assigned (evenly by the end of
the study) to one of the three conditions.
Participants read a false cover story presented as an Urban Institute research brief in the first
condition to manipulate the independent variable. The cover story gave deliberately inaccurate
percentages of white males in the United States either as relatively holding steady with some
minor loss for believability (condition 1) or majority loss status (condition 2) over time.
Condition three, the participants received no information regarding the percentage of change of
the group over time and proceeded to the surveys. Participants saw a report that depicts
percentages of representation from 10 years ago, current trends, and projected statistics ten years
from now for conditions one and two. Following the manipulations, participants were presented
with randomized surveys to complete to avoid the potential for order effects (see Figure3). In
cases where appropriate, items were randomized as well. Following the presentation of
manipulations, participants completed measures of in-group prejudice, emotion-group
associations such as anger and sadness, and individual and group power measures. Those
measures are discussed in detail in the following subsection.
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Experiment Begin

Participant enters the
study online

Informed Consent

Agree to
Participate?

No

End of Study

Yes

Demographic Questions

Collective Self-Esteem
Two Scales
Randomized

Social Dominance
Orientation

Participant
Randomly
assigned

Condition One (Loss of
Majority Status)

Manipulation

Participant reads an
Article regarding loss of
status (percentage)

Manipulation

Condition Two (No
Change in Majority
Status)

Control Condition (no
manipulation)

Participant reads an
Article regarding no
change in status
(percentage)

No manipulation

Individual Stigma

Group Stigma

Intergroup Prejudice

Intergroup Sadness
All Scales/Measures
Randomized

Intergroup Anger

Individual Self-Esteem

Group Power

Individual Power

Study Debrief

End of Study

Figure 2 - Status-based White Male Stigma Research Experimental Design
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Measures
Before receiving the manipulation conditions, the following measures will be used in determining
individual differences.
Demographics. The demographics section asked commonly used questions related to the
participants’, age, gender identity, racial/ethnicity identity, the subject’s level of education
completed, household highest level of education, sexual preference and identity, household
income, household composition, employment status, political identification, the candidate they
would have voted for as an indicator of their political ideology, and religious/denominational
identity. These questions are to determine if any individual differences might contribute to
interactional effects within the data.

Moderated Variables
Given that we tested moderated variables, we expected that the moderating effects of perceived
group status and power would be magnified by group importance (collective self-esteem) and
social dominance orientation. This study implemented the following measures in the
determination of any moderating effects. Those measures are:
A measure of Collective Self Esteem. In the measurement of Collective Self-Esteem, Luhtaen and
Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale was used. This scale measures one’s self-esteem
related to their social identity (e.g., Taijfel & Turner, 1986) and the positive effect of group
membership. The scale includes four domains. Those domains are membership, privacy, public
association, and identity. The domain of membership is defined as one’s worthiness and
contributions to their group. Privacy relates to how much the person individually appreciates the
group and its membership, in other words, one’s private view of the group and its value. The third
domain, or public opinion, is how the group is perceived by the greater cultural context,
particularly if they have positive attributes. The fourth domain is identity, or how much the
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individual identifies personally with the group. These measures provide insight into one’s social
identity and the self-esteem benefits or disadvantages that result from their association and
identification with the group.
A Measure of Social Dominance Orientation. Social dominance orientation (SDO) measures the
extent to which one group is perceived to be better than or to dominate other groups. The SDO
measure is a difference between a preference for hierarchical versus equal group differences.
Those who are high on SDO prefer policies and ideologies which benefit their group over others.
This is due to their view that their group should have the authority and make decisions. SDO
could serve as a moderator for those in high versus low-status groups. Those higher on SDO may
be more likely to prefer dominance or over low-status groups and might see the loss of power as
particularly detrimental to their hierarchy perceive themselves to be stigmatized.

Manipulations
For the manipulation, three conditions were implemented. In the first condition, participants read
a cover story regarding the changing racial landscape in the United States. The language read as
follows:
“As part of a nationwide demographic study of racial trends within the United States and
working with the United States Census Bureau, the United States Department of Labor
and the United States Department of Education, The Urban Institute triangulated a series
of data sets to more accurately determine how racial identity has changed over time. Ten
years ago, white males made up roughly 60% of the American Population. Currently,
they make up 58% and are projected to be 56% (40% for condition two) by 2040, given
current trends.”
In condition one, the participants read that their group is currently losing status, while in
condition two, research participants read that there has been little change in representation. In the
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third condition, participants did not read a story, serving as the control condition. Following the
article, participants were asked to write a short qualitative answer explaining why they believe the
data has trended. This manipulation explored if one’s perception of change in their group
influence translates into a perception of stigma. Therefore, any potential changes within the
dependent variables of perceived prejudice, intergroup emotions, individual self-esteem, and
group power follow similar trends observed in the current literature.

Dependent Measures
This study employed measures of individual and group stigma, individual self-esteem, intergroup
prejudice, and a measure of emotions using items related to controversial groups and one’s
perception of emotion toward these groups.
An internalized stigma measure was used. This measure consists of 29 items employing the
Ghanean, Ritscher et al., (2003) measure of Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness except that the
adjectives and sentence phrases of mental illness were adapted to highlight white maleness. The
measure has five subdomains. Those domains are alienation, stereotype endorsement,
discrimination experience, social withdrawal, and stigma resistance. Alienation refers to the
experience of isolation from others, particularly those considered normative within society.
Stereotype endorsement refers to one’s view that they embody commonly held stereotypes
regarding their reference group. Discrimination experience measures are the extent to which
people have perceived and felt stigmatized concerning others. In social withdrawal measures, the
participant’s perceived experience of withdrawing from social experiences results from their
salient stigma. The final domain of stigma resistance measures the person’s ability to be
unaffected by internalized stigma regardless of environmental signals, highlighting the person’s
differences. The stigma items were presented twice. One group of questions presented related to
one’s experience as an individual who has personally experienced stigma as a white male. At the
same time, the second set of items explored one’s belief that their group has experienced stigma
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as white males. This comprehensive measure has been used in various clinical settings; however,
the questions can be shifted to other stigmatizing situations, including white male identity.
A Measure of Individual Self Esteem. To measure individual self-esteem, the Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale was used. This is a unidimensional ten-item measure. This scale is a measurement
of state self-esteem. We can determine to what degree stigma is related to individual self-esteem
for high versus low-status groups by including this measure.
A measure of Intergroup Prejudice. For a measure of intergroup prejudice, the Quick
Discrimination Index was used. This measure is a 30-item index of two domains related to
multiculturalism and women’s equality. Items include attitudinal and effective themes related to
racial diversity and women’s equity from social policy and opinion. This scale is of particular use
here as the domains would serve as the reference group for which high-status individuals may
have an intergroup prejudice (Ponterotto et al., 1995).
A Measure of Intergroup Emotions: To measure emotional reactions (similar to Mackie, Devos,
& Smith 2000 but modified to simplify language about groups), a series of questions asked
participants about their emotional attitudes toward outgroups. We asked participants to think
about the emotions they immediately feel when thinking about each group if they associate any
emotion with the group at all. They were then asked to select an emotion from the list. We then
summed the number of emotions related to each group and compared the frequency of emotions
by the group. Those groups identified are Democrats, Lesbians, Liberals, Conservatives,
Republicans, Black Lives Matter, women’s equality, NAACP, American Civil Liberties Union,
white males, right-wing militias, and alt-right (Gendron, Roberson, Marietta van der Vyver, &
Feldman Barrett 2014). The emotions provided in the list were happiness, sadness, emotionally
torn, interest, anger, fear, indifference, and “not familiar with this group.”
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A Measure of Power. Given that perceived power might moderate the effect of stigma and the
specific dependent variables, two power measures were employed for this study. The measure of
power used was Anderson et al. (2005)’s Generalized Sense of Power Scale, which measures
perceived individual power in relationships with others and social settings. We modified this
version to ask questions about group power. Both the group and individual measures of power
reference the participant’s white male or religious group identity as part of each item. This study
attempted to determine if perceived stigma varies as a function of perceived power or perceived
loss of power by including these different measures. In other words, is stigma seen as a loss of
power as a group or one’s membership in a group, or is stigma the concern with a mark on their
individual or group identity?

Manipulation Checks
Following the presentation of the manipulation conditions, participants were asked to
recall the instructions given to them and respond to items to ensure attention and understanding of
the instructions. Participants responded to nuance multiple choice questions regarding the
instructions given to them. They were asked, “have you personally ever been discriminated for
being a white male?”

Study Two
Sample
For demographics, all participants were Christians. Again, we combined the two samples into a
single study. The average age of the participants was 47.2, with a standard deviation of 14.82
with an age range of 19 to 85. Further, n = 95 (29.1%) of our participants identified as male with
n = 230 (70.3%) identified as female. In terms of education, participants reported completed high
school n = 21 (6.4%), some college n = 218 (66.7%), and graduate education n = 86 (26.3%). In
terms of marital status, n = 75 (22.9%) identified as never married, and n = 188 (57.5%) indicated
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being married. In terms of self-described political association, n = 176 (53.8%) identified as some
type of conservative with n = 132 (40.3%) identifying as liberal. Further, we asked participants
which of the Bromley definitions best identify their religious tradition. Those who indicated
either contestant or subversive religious types were removed via case-wise deletion. These two
categories likely experience some degree of stigma due to the perceived cultural tension of their
religious identity. Examples of subversive traditions are Jehovah’s Witnesses or the Twelve
Tribes where their beliefs constitute cultural tension. Utilizing TurkPrime, we recruited
participants from the United States. Informed consents were provided digitally within Qualtrics,
an online survey system including a description of the method with statements like “this survey is
based on your attitudes toward various world issues,” as well as a typical timeframe of
completion and standard consent language informing the potential participant of their rights by
participating in this study.
The sample was collected from TurkPrime and various social media platforms. Informed consents
were provided digitally within Qualtrics, an online survey system including a description of the
method with statements like “this survey is based on your attitudes toward various world issues,”
as well as a typical timeframe of completion and standard consent language informing the
potential participant of their rights by participating in the study. Participants were able to
download a PDF copy of the informed consent for their records following the end of the study.
Further, participants were debriefed regarding the nature of the study. Participation was
voluntary. TurkPrime workers were paid for their time, and social media participants were asked
to volunteer to complete the survey. While we initially collected emails for participants during the
study, all data was contained in an encrypted password folder.

Procedure
Just as in study one, similar online data collection strategies were employed. This study utilized
Qualtrics and online solicitation through social media. This study applied an experimental three
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condition design where two of the three conditions serve as manipulations. Beginning the study,
all participants completed measures of demographics, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), and
Collective Self-Esteem, with SDO and Collective Self-Esteem randomly presented.
As part of the experiment, one of the three conditions was presented. In the first condition as
manipulating the independent variable, participants read a false cover story presented as an Urban
Institute research brief, giving inaccurate percentages of Christians in the United States either as
holding steady (condition 1) or decreasing (condition 2) over time. Condition three, the
participants received no information regarding the percentage of change of the group over time.
Participants saw an article that depicted percentages of representation from 10 years ago, current
trends, and projected statistics ten years from now for conditions one and two. Participants were
asked to write a response to the article to allow them to reflect on the manipulation. Following the
manipulations, participants were presented with randomized surveys to complete to avoid the
potential for order effects. In cases where appropriate, items were randomized as well. Following
the presentation of manipulations, participants completed measures of in-group prejudice,
emotion-group association measures including such emotions as anger and sadness, and measures
of individual and group power. Those measures are discussed in detail in the following
subsection. Each level of the 3x3 will be counterbalanced in detecting ordering effects.

Measures
The measures were employed in previous research with tested and validated psychometric
properties. The following scales were used to explore the various aspects of stigma and correlated
constructs.
Demographics. The demographics section asked the same questions as presented in study one.
However, this study also included religious/denominational identity (coded later for the Bromley
typology), religious services attendance, and a single item measure asking about the participant’s
view of their tradition within the Bromley (1998) typology. Of particular interest here is the
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Bromley categories both as research codes and participant self-declaration in measuring cultural
tension, which might exist by identifying with a belief system. Further, the demographic section
included a question regarding the participant's conversion from faith or lack thereof. This
question ranged from their childhood and how many years have passed since their religious
conversion. The questionnaire also asked a single-item question regarding the participant’s
identity related to “spiritual but not religious, spiritual and religious, religious but not spiritual,
and neither spiritual, not religious,” all from of Streib et al. (2009). Moreover, participants were
asked what percentage of the population of Christians (not a particular denomination) constitute
the whole of their current town or community. This question was divided into three parts, the first
percentage of the representation ten years ago, their percentage of representation now, and the
percentage of representation ten years in the future.

Moderating Variables
A measure of Collective Self Esteem. In the measurement of Collective Self-Esteem, Luhtaen,
and Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale was be used.
A measure of Social Dominance Orientation. Social dominance orientation (SDO) measures how
one group is perceived to better or dominate other groups. SDO measure is a difference between a
preference for a hierarchical versus equal group differences.

Manipulation
In the second set of independent factors (second level), three conditions were presented. In the
first condition as a manipulation of the independent variable, participants read a false cover story
presented as an Urban Institute research brief with inaccurate percentages of Christians in the
United States either as holding steady with a small loss for realism (condition 1) or a clear
decreasing trend (condition 2) over time. Condition three, the participants received no
information regarding the percentage of change of the group over time. Participants read an
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article that depicts percentages of group representation from 10 years ago, current trends, and
projected statistics ten years from now for conditions one and two. Following the manipulations,
participants were presented with randomized surveys to avoid the potential for ordering effects. In
cases where appropriate, items were also be randomized as well. Following the presentation of
manipulations, participants completed measures of in-group prejudice, emotion measures such as
anger and sadness, and individual and group power measures, all as included in study one. Those
measures are discussed in detail later.
A measure of Individual Self Esteem. To measure individual self-esteem, the Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale was used.
A Measure of Intergroup Emotions: In measuring emotional reactions (similar to Mackie, Devos,
& Smith 2000 but modified to simplify language about groups), a series of questions asked
participants about their emotional attitudes toward religious outgroups. We asked participants to
think about the emotions, what they immediately feel when thinking about each group, and if
participants associate any specific emotion with the group. They were then asked to select an
emotion from the list. We then summed the number of emotions related to each group and
compared the frequency of emotions by the group. Those groups used in this study are Atheists,
Agnostics, Jews, Protestant Christians, Humanism, Buddhism, Catholics, Mormons, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Nation of Islam, Muslims, Scientology, Church of Satan, Pagans, Spiritual
Individuals, and Westboro Baptist. These groups served as those of like type such as protestant
Christians and those of unlike type such as humanists, Church of Satan, Pagans and others. We
included the following emotions or categories, happiness, sadness, emotionally torn, interest,
anger, fear, indifference, and not familiar with this group (Gendron, Roberson, Marietta van der
Vyver, & Feldman Barrett 2014).
A Measure of Power. As noted earlier, power could moderate the effect of stigma and the specific
dependent variables. Two measures of perceived power were employed for this study. The
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measure of power used was Anderson et al. (2005)’s Generalized Sense of Power Scale, which
measures perceived individual power in relationships with others and social settings. We
modified this version to ask questions about group power. The group and individual power
measure reference the participant’s religious group identity as part of each item stem. This study
attempted to determine if perceived stigma varies as a function of perceived power or perceived
loss of power by including these different measures.
Measures of Concealment and Disclosure. Given that Christianity is a concealable identity and if
such an identity could be stigmatized, two additional measures were employed for study two. The
first measure is adapted from the Jackson and Mohr (2016) Sexual Orientation Concealment
Scale. This measures an individual’s active concealment of their sexual identity and status
through various behavioral strategies of concealment. Items include “In the last two weeks, I have
concealed my sexual orientation by telling someone that I was straight or denying that I was
LGB” In this case, the item was reworded to “In the last two weeks, I have concealed my
Christian identity by telling someone I was not religious or denying that I was Christian.”
Another modified example is, “In the last two weeks, I have allowed others to assume I am not
religious without correcting them.” In the measurement of participant outness, the study used the
Outness Inventory adapted for Christian participants. The Outness Inventory developed by Mohr
& Fassinger (2000) asks questions related to their identity. This question includes “how open you
are about your sexual orientation to the people listed below” and include parents, siblings,
extended family, new friends, work peers. Some items will be excluded as they pertain only to the
LGBTQQ community and not Christians (e.g., “my old heterosexual friends,” “members of my
religious community,” “leaders of my religious community”). If Christian identity is stigmatized,
then there should be similar patterns of concealment and disclosure, as observed within the
LGBTQQ community.
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Manipulation Checks
Following the presentation of the manipulation conditions, participants were asked to
recall the instructions given to them and respond to items to ensure attention and understanding of
the instructions.
A measure of Stigma. Using an internalized stigma measure of 29 items, this study used Ghanean,
Ritscher et al. (2003)’s measure of Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness except that the
adjectives and sentence phrases of mental illness were adapted to target allegiant Christians. The
stigma items were presented twice. One group of questions were related to one’s experience as an
individual who has experienced stigma as an Allegiant Christian. The second set of items will
explore one’s experience with stigma as a group. This comprehensive measure has been used in
various clinical settings; however, the questions can be shifted to other stigmatizing situations,
including Allegiant Christian identity.
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Chapter Four: Results
This research explored two aspects of Stigma. The first study investigated the
extent of stigma related to race or, in this case, being white. The second study examined a
concealable stigma or, in this case, being Christian. Therefore, this chapter will explore
each study in detail, providing analysis for each research question and explorative
analysis of correlates of these identities and the relationship to experimental manipulation
of perceived loss of status. Each research question will be addressed individually for both
studies with complementary analysis related to the specific question. Study two includes
additional measures of concealment and disclosure not pertinent to study one, given race
is a physical trait and likely challenging to conceal. Between the two studies, a total of
n=118 participants were excluded from analysis for either not completing the survey or
failing the attention check.
Study One
As part of study one, we attempted to manipulate one's perceived majority status
within American society as a white male, an apparent identity that is difficult to conceal.
Data were collected from two sources. The first was collected through TurkPrime, a
crowdsourced research participant platform. The second was collected through
purposeful snowball sampling of self-identified white males via social media (Facebook
and Twitter). Before the study, a power analysis was conducted assuming small effect
sizes (α = .05, two-tailed) with an expected beta of β ≥ .14 and f2 ≥ .02 per recommended
effect size thresholds (Cohen, 1988). A total of 246 participants were recruited via
TurkPrime and 125 from social media for 371 total participants. However, while
literature exists related to minority or low-status experiences of Stigma, this research
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project tested similar assumptions of high-status individuals. It, therefore, served as a
new area of exploration. Assuming a medium effect size, the estimated required sample
size was 150 in detecting the effect. Moreover, all moderators were mean-centered before
running the model. All measures were near or within acceptable limits for reliability (see
Table 2). The only exceptions are the Membership Self-Esteem (α = .694) and Private
Collective Self-Esteem (α = .677), near the acceptability threshold. The overall
distribution of scores was first tested to determine if this study met the parametric
assumption (Tukey, 1977). The initial general tests for normality were violated based on
the Shapiro Wilks test initially, all violating measures violating the parametric
assumption (p < .05).
The results are reported utilizing the following stepped process. First, the
normality of the sample was determined to reduced hypothesis testing error. This was
done using preliminary assessments of normality for the general sample and comparison
groups where appropriate. If those tests were violated, one of two solutions was
deployed. The first was to attempt to address outliers a reduce the tails of a distribution
utilizing transformation calculations as noted from the psychometric literature. To adjust
for the extreme outliers and based on Hoaglin & Iglewicz (1987), we estimated outliers
using 2.2 multipliers to determine two standard deviation numerical thresholds above and
below the mean for each averaged score. This provided the criteria for the removal of
extreme outliers. While the parametric assumption is still violated, the effect can be
detected using general linear modeling in comparing main effects and interactions
(Hoaglin. Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986).
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Table 2 - Reliabilities of Measures Used for White Males

Scale
Collective Self Esteem
Membership self-esteem
Private collective selfesteem
Public collective selfesteem
Importance to Identity
Social Dominance Orientation
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Quick Discrimination Index
Individual Power
Group Power
Emotion Measure
Stigma Measure White

Cronbach's
Alpha
0.846
0.694

Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items
0.849
0.694

N of
Items
16
4

0.677

0.690

4

0.709
0.828
0.938
0.914
0.943
0.875
0.905
0.820
0.932

0.708
0.829
0.939
0.918
0.941
0.875
0.905
0.821
0.938

4
4
16
10
30
8
8
12
25
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The second solution was to shift to nonparametric tests in lieu of parametric tests. For
those where the parametric assumption was met following data transformation or where
the distribution was already normal, the study tested for homogeneity of variances and
homoscedasticity of error variances before testing the overall effect and any influence
observed by moderators. Further, we used mean-centered values of moderators to test
interaction effects.
H1: When white males are led to believe that their group is losing its numeric
majority, participants will report higher group stigma as compared to those who
perceive their group majority to stay constant.
To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we first tested the overall main effect of
Condition on Stigma. No significant main effect was detected by condition at F(2, 345) =
1.044, p=.353, partial η2 = .006. Further, as a test of the interaction between the
moderator of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the condition variable,
homogeneity of regression slopes was tested. Homogeneity of regression slopes as the
interaction term was not statistically significant, F(2, 342) = .926, p =.397, partial η2 =
.005. As an additional test of normality for within-group residuals, normality was tested
for each condition. As expected, based on our earlier checks of normality, all three
conditions violated normality for group residuals (p < .05). While we did not meet the
assumption of random assignment, the proportions of observations are similar enough
that analysis can continue given the extreme variables were removed. We examined the
normality of within-group residuals, and while they violated normality, they were within
±3.5 standard deviations. Therefore, any outliers did not exceed that threshold of the
standardized 2.13 value (Huitema, 2011). General Linear Modeling assumes that the
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variance of the residuals is equal for all groups of the independent variable. If the
variances are unequal, this can affect the Type I error rate. Further, we tested the overall
homogeneity of variances, which was confirmed (p = .845).
There was homoscedasticity, as determined by visual inspection of the
standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as seen in Figure 4.
Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis one was
conducted. There was no main effect of condition by White Stigma, F(2, 342) = .625, p =
.536, partial η2 = .004. There was a main effect of Social Dominance Orientation, F(1,
342) = 80.099, p =.000, partial η2 = .190. Furthermore there was no significant two-way
interaction for condition, SDO F(2, 342) = .926, p =.397, partial η2 = .005 (see Figure 5).
Based on these findings, it appears that SDO has a main effect on Stigma in that as SDO
increased, perceived Stigma increased but did not moderate one's stigma score when
manipulating their perceived loss in status. Essentially, in each condition, as SDO
increases, so too does perceived stigma.
In addition to SDO, we examined the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on
perceived white Stigma. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we examined the
normality of within-group residuals. While they violated normality, they were within
±3.5 standard deviations, and therefore any outliers did not exceed that threshold of the
standardized 2.13 value. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of
the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 6).
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Figure 4 - Simple Scatter of Standardized Residuals for White Stigma

Figure 5 - Model Fit Scatterplot for Social Dominance Orientation for White Stigma
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We conducted a test of homogeneity of variances utilizing Levene's test (p = .605). Again
in testing the hypothesis, there was no main effect by condition, F(2, 342) = 1.698, p =
.185, partial η2 = .010. There was a main effect for collective self-esteem, F(1, 342) =
23.667, p = .000, partial η2 = .065 where perceived white stigma increases, overall
collective self-esteem decreases. There was no significant 2-way interaction for condition
by collective self-esteem, F(2, 342) = .157, p = .855, partial η2 = .001 (see Figure 7).
Mainly, this analysis seems to indicate that our experimental manipulation did not have
an effect. However, some individual differences correlated with perceived white Stigma
(SDO and Collective Self Esteem).
H2: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, we expect increased prejudice toward low-status outgroups
compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.
We first examined the main effect of Condition on the Quick Discrimination Index (QDI)
Score. As a reminder, a higher score on the QDI indicates lower discriminatory attitudes
toward outgroups. We observed an overall main effect of condition on QDI, F(2, 343) =
5.619, p = .004, partial η2 = .032. We further decomposed the effect by condition to
determine which condition contributes to the predictive variance through pairwise
comparisons and posthoc analysis using Tukey's B. The "loss" condition (M = 3.66) was
a statistically higher average QDI score than the other two conditions of the "almost no
loss" condition (M = 3.3294) as well as the "control" condition (M = 3.4304). There were
no significant differences observed between the "almost no loss" and "control"
conditions. This would seem to indicate that the loss condition may have had an effect on
perceived Stigma.
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Figure 6 - Simple Scatter of Standardized Residuals for Stigma by Predicted Value by
Condition for White Stigma

Figure 7 - Model Fit Scatter Plot for Moderated Collective Self Esteem for White Stigma
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Further, we examined the moderating effects of SDO and Collective Self Esteem. We
first included SDO within the model. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we first
tested the homogeneity of regression slopes to ensure no relationship. It was observed
that there was no significant relationship between the regression slopes as indicated, F(2,
340) = .750, p = .473, partial η2 = .004. Further, we conducted a test of the normal
distribution of residuals. The residuals were normally distributed as assessed by ShapiroWilks (p > .05). In plotting the standardized residuals as a test of homoscedasticity. We
plotted the observed versus the predicted residuals (see Figure 8).
It would appear that the assumption of homoscedasticity has been met. Additionally, we
conducted a test of equality of variances. The assumption of homogeneity of variances
was violated, as assessed by Levene's test for equality of variances (p = .009). Based on
this finding, we adjusted QDI as the dependent variable using a "reflect and logarithmic"
transformation (Osborne & Overbay, 2008). This approach allows the tightening of
extreme skews in the data or, in our case, a negative skew. After transforming QDI using
this approach, variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity
of variance (p = .276). Given we transformed QDI, we tested again for outliers. While
SPSS detected some outliers were among the standardized residual values (n=9), they
were close enough to the three standard deviation thresholds that we can proceed with
parametric predictive analysis (Judd et al., 2009; Osborne & Overlay, 2008).
Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis two was
conducted. To test the full model and main effects using the Log adjust QDI scores, we
observe that condition approaches significance, F(2, 340) = 2.655, p = .072, partial η2 =
.015. Again SDO is a significant predictor of QDI, F(1, 340) = 387.414, p = .000, partial
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η2 = .533 which is a significant effect as indicated by the eta score. There is not a
significant two-way interaction for condition by SDO, F(2, 340) = 1.732, p = .178, partial
η2 = .178 (see Figure 9). This indicates that as SDO increases, QDI decreases across
condition.
Further, we examined the moderating influence of Collective Self-Esteem on QDI
between conditions. First, we tested to determine if there was a linear relationship
between QDI and Collective Self Esteem. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as
the interaction term was not statistically significant, F(2, 240) = 1.732, p = .178.
Continuing to use the reflect and logarithmic adjusted QDI variable, we tested the
standardized residuals. The conditions were normally distributed, as assessed by ShapiroWilk's test (p > .05). There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the
standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values.
In an examination of outliers, no cases with standardized residuals greater than
±3.5 standard deviations were included. Having met all prerequisites for analysis, we
examined the main effect and 2-way interaction. When including Collective Self-Esteem
in the model, there was a main effect for condition, F(2, 340) = 3.639, p = .027, partial η2
= .021. Further, there was a main effect of Collective Self-Esteem, F(2, 340) = 40.516, p
= .000, partial η2 = .106. Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between
condition and Collective Self-Esteem, F(2, 340) = .250, p = .779, partial η2 = .001. To
further interpret the main effects, there was a significant difference between the
conditions for QDI using pairwise comparisons (see Figure 11).
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Figure 8 - Simple Scatter of Standardized Residuals for Quick Discrimination Index by
Condition for White Stigma

Figure 9 - Grouped Scatter of Standardized Residuals for Log Adjusted Quick
Discrimination Index by Social Dominance Orientation Mean Centered by Condition for
White Stigma
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Figure 10 - Standardized Residuals for Log Adjusted Quick Discrimination Index by
Predicted Values by Condition for White Stigma

Figure 11 - Log Adjusted Quick Discrimination Index Scores as Moderated by Collective
Self-Esteem for White Stigma
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There was a significant difference between the Loss Condition (M = .339) compared to
Almost Loss Condition (M = .385) as well as Control (M = .376). No significant
difference was observed between the "Almost no Loss" Condition and the "Control"
condition. When including collective self-esteem in the model, it appears there are main
effects of Condition for QDI with the loss condition showing the greatest significant
increase where Collective Self-Esteem increases, so too does QDI.
H3: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric
majority status but have likely had hierarchical and social power (were once high
status) and by extension have probably enjoyed some successful confrontations
with other groups, expect higher anger than sadness.
We asked participants to report on which groups they associated with specific emotions.
Many of the participants skipped these items leaving this study with some incomplete
data. The following data reported are for those who reported and the group's participants
associated with specific emotions. We summed the number of groups by the associated
emotions using a frequentist approach to analysis. To examine the differences between
group identity with emotion frequencies, we utilized a nonparametric test of difference.
Given this design and the variability of the number of groups associated with each
emotion, we used The Kruskal-Wallis H test (sometimes called the "one-way ANOVA on
ranks").
While we tested which groups were associated with anger and sadness the most, we also
included other emotion variables. Those include happiness, emotionally torn, interest,
fear, as well as "not familiar."
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Table 3 - Nonparametric Hypothesis Test Summary for Liberal versus Conservative
Groups by Emotion for White Males

Null Hypothesis
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Happiness is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Happiness is the same
across categories of
condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Sadness is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Sadness is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Emotionally
Torn is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Emotionally Torn is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Interest is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Interest is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Anger is the
same across categories of
condition.

Test
Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

Sig.
0.679

Decision
Retain the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.761

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.470

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.463

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.897

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.073

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.016

Reject the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.590

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Independent-Samples
Kruskal-Wallis Test

0.281

Retain the null
hypothesis.
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Table 3 Continued
Null Hypothesis

Test

Sig.

The distribution of
Independent-Samples
0.091
Conservative Groups by
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Anger is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Independent-Samples
0.654
Groups by Fear is the same
Kruskal-Wallis Test
across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Independent-Samples
0.542
Conservative Groups by
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Fear is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Independent-Samples
0.298
Groups by Not Familiar is
Kruskal-Wallis Test
the same across categories
of condition.
The distribution of
Independent-Samples
0.905
Conservative Groups by Not
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Familiar is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Independent-Samples
0.189
Groups by Indifferent is the
Kruskal-Wallis Test
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Independent-Samples
0.701
Conservative Groups by
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Indifferent is the same
across categories of
condition.
Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .050.

Decision
Retain the null
hypothesis.

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Retain the null
hypothesis.

Retain the null
hypothesis.
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Neither anger nor sadness was significantly different between conditions within
our study (see Table 3). We did detect a significant difference in self-reported interest
between groups for Liberal Groups, particularly between the loss condition and the
almost loss condition and control. While the Conservative Groups by Anger comparison
did not meet the critical value to reject the null, it did appear to approach significance,
Χ2(2) = 4.798, p = .091. This is likely due to the overall distribution variability between
conditions (see Figure 12). Therefore, based on the original hypothesis of anger or
sadness toward outgroups, we must retain the null hypothesis as neither anger nor sadness
was statistically significantly different between conditions.

H4: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they will show lower individual self-esteem.
Returning to parametric analysis and moderation, we examined the main effect of
condition on individual self-esteem. We first examined the main effect of the condition
on Rosenberg's Individual Self-Esteem. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, the
initial normality tests were well within the acceptable thresholds for parametric testing
for Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances for the overall mean (p = .348).
However, there was no main effect for condition on individual self-esteem, F(2, 346) =
1.332, p = .265. Further, as a test of the interaction between the covariate of Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the condition variable, homogeneity of regression
slopes was tested. The homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not
statistically significant, F(2, 343) = .364, p = .695, meaning we have met the assumption
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of homogeneity of regression slopes permitting additional normality testing before
conducting further parametric analysis (see Figure 13).
Further, we tested the normality of the within-group residuals by condition. As
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test, standardized residuals for the conditions were normally
distributed (p > .05). Next, we tested for homoscedasticity of error variances within each
group, and the error variances are equal between groups. There was homoscedasticity, as
assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted
values (see Figure 14).
We also checked for extreme outliers in our data for Individual Self-Esteem.
Fifteen participants exceeded standardized residuals higher than ±3.5 standard deviations.
Nevertheless, the values were close enough to the standard deviations beyond the mean
that parametric analysis can proceed without any type of data transformation (Figure 14).
Having met all prerequisites for parametric analysis, we examined the main effect and 2way interaction. When including SDO in the model, there was no main effect for
condition, F(2, 343) = .898, p = .408, partial η2 = .005 in predicting Individual SelfEsteem. Further, there was a main effect of SDO F(1, 343) = 6.694, p = .010, partial η2 =
.019. Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition and SDO,
F(2, 343) = .364, p = .695, partial η2 = .002. Therefore, it appears that the only predictive
variance in the model is related to SDO but not by Condition by SDO in predicting SelfEsteem. Therefore, it appears that SDO has a main effect on individual self-esteem. Still,
there is no main effect by the condition or a 2-way interaction between SDO by
Condition on Individual Self-Esteem. We further explore if collective self-esteem overall
influenced the model.
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Figure 12 - Overall Distribution frequency of reported Anger for Conservative Groups by
Condition for White Stigma

Figure 13 - Social Dominance Orientation by Condition for the Rosenberg Individual
Self-Esteem Scale for White Stigma
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Figure 14 - Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals for Rosenberg Individual Self-Esteem
Scale by Condition for White Stigma
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Exploring the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Individual SelfEsteem, we first examined if there was homogeneity of regression slopes. There was
homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant,
F(2, 343) = .558, p = .573. As assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test, the conditions were
normally distributed for the standardized residuals (p > .05). We tested for
homoscedasticity to ensure we met the assumption of homoscedasticity of error variances
within each group. Homoscedasticity was assessed by visual inspection of the
standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as indicated in Figure 15.
Further, we met the threshold of Equity of Error Variances (p = .269).
When including Individual Self-Esteem in the model, there was no main effect for
condition, F(2, 343) = .848, p = .429, partial η2 = .005 in predicting Individual SelfEsteem. Further, there was a main effect of Individual Self-Esteem, F(2, 343) = 7.347, p
= .007, partial η2 = .021. Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between
condition and Individual Self-Esteem, F(2, 343) = .558, p = .573, partial η2 = .003.
Therefore, it appears that the only predictive variance in the model is related to Individual
Self-Esteem but not by Condition by Individual Self-Esteem in predicting Self-Esteem
(see Figure 16). This means that as collective self-esteem increases, so does individual
self-esteem. Overall, there was no significant effect by condition even when including
either SDO or Individual Self-Esteem in the model.
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Figure 15 - Scatterplot of Standard Residuals for Rosenberg Individual Self-Esteem by
Condition for White Stigma

Figure 16 - Scatterplot of Collective Self-Esteem by Rosenberg’s Individual Self-Esteem
Scale for White Stigma
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H5: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status,
they will perceive themselves to lose group power.
Using the Measure of Perceived Group Power, we explored the main effect of condition
on group power and the moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)
and Overall Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived Group Power. First, we examined only
the main effect of Condition on Group Power. To test preliminary parametric
assumptions, we tested the overall Equity of Error Variances using Levene's and met the
threshold (p > .05). Yet there was no overall main effect for Condition by Perceived
Group Power, F(2, 348) = 2.185, p = .114, partial η2 = .012. We again explored the
moderating effect of Social Dominance Orientation and Overall Collective Self-Esteem
on Perceived Group Power. We first tested for homogeneity of regression slopes as the
interaction term was not statistically significant, F(2, 345) = .002, p = .998. This allowed
us to continue with the assumption of linearity. Moreover, standardized residuals for the
interventions were normally distributed for the Almost no loss Condition or Control, as
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05). However, the loss condition did not meet the
normality threshold; however, still acceptable to proceed with the parametric analysis.
Further, there was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized
residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 17). At least eight small value
outliers were assessed in the data, as assessed by standardized residuals greater than ±3.5
standard deviations. Yet, given the small number of outliers, they did not extend beyond
the three standard deviations. Given we were either close or within acceptable limits of
normality testing, we proceeded with the overall analysis of the main effect of condition
with the main effect of SDO on Perceived Group Power.
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In testing the hypothesis, there was no main effect for condition by group power,
F(2, 345) = .746, p = .475, partial η2 = .004. There was a significant main effect for SDO
on Perceived Group Power, F(1, 345) = 135.988, p = .000, partial η2 = .283. Moreover,
there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition by SDO for Perceived
Group Power F(2, 348) = .002, p = .998, partial η2 = .000. Essentially, we see the main
effect of SDO on the dependent variable, similar to the other research questions
addressed in this study. Nevertheless, again, condition had no main effect on group
power. We shifted to examine the influence of overall Collective Self-Esteem on Group
Power (see Figure 18).
Further, as before, we included Overall Collective Self-Esteem in the model to
determine if it influenced the relationship between our independent variable of condition
on our dependent variable of Group Power. We first tested for homogeneity of the
regression slopes, F(2, 345) = .268, p = .765 indicating the interaction was not
statistically significant. When testing for normality among the standardized residuals for
each Condition by Collective Self Esteem were normally distributed as indicated by
Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05). Further, we tested for homoscedasticity before testing the
complete model (see Figure 19).
As can be observed in Figure 19, all three conditions appear to have
homoscedasticity. Yet, the control condition does approach a decreasing funnel shape in
the data distribution and yet falls within a similar pattern to the other conditions.
Therefore, the data does not require a data transformation to proceed.

77

Figure 17 - Scatterplot of Standardized Residuals for Perceived Group Power by
Condition for White Stigma

Figure 18 - Scatterplot by Condition by Social Dominance Orientation for White Stigma
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Having met all preassessment of normality and homogeneity, we proceeded with the
overall test of the model between Condition by Collective Self-Esteem in predicting
Perceived Group Power.
In testing the overall model, there was no significant main effect for condition,
F(2, 345) = 2.404, p = .092, partial η2 = .014. Additionally, Collective Self-Esteem did
not contribute to the main effect in predicting Group Power, F(1, 345) = .981, p = .323,
partial η2 = .003. Moreover, there was not a significant 2-way interaction for Condition
by Collective Self Esteem in predicting Group Power, F(2, 345) = .268, p = .765, partial
η2 = .002, (see Figure 20).
Therefore, based on this model, the condition did not contribute significant overall
variance in predicting Perceived Group Power. Additionally, Collective Self Esteem
neither significantly strengthens nor weakened the relationship between Condition and
Group Power. Therefore, we would accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant
main effect for Perceived Group Power.

H6: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose individual power.
In exploring a Measure of Perceived Individual Power, we explored the main effect of
condition on individual power and the moderating influence of Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO) and Overall Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived Group Power. We
tested only the main effect of Condition on Individual Power.
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Figure 19 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Standardized Residuals for Perceived
Group Power for White Stigma

Figure 20 - Scatterplot of Group Power as Predicted by Condition and Overall
Collective Self-Esteem for White Stigma
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To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we tested the overall Equity of Error
Variances using Levene's and met the threshold (p > .05). Yet there was no overall main
effect for Condition by Perceived individual Power, F(2, 345) = .902, p = .402, partial η2
= .005.
In continuation of our inclusion of the potential moderating influence of Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Collective Self Esteem, we again examined if these
measures contributed to predicting the overall model and two-way interactions within the
model. We first tested for homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was
not statistically significant, F(2, 342) = .266, p = .766. This allowed us to continue with
the assumption of linearity. Moreover, standardized residuals for the interventions were
normally distributed for the Almost no loss Condition or Control, as assessed by ShapiroWilk's test (p > .05).
At least twelve small value outliers were assessed in the data, as assessed by
standardized residuals greater than ±3.5 standard deviations. Yet, given the small number
of outliers, they did not extend beyond the three standard deviations. Given we were
either close or within acceptable limits of normality testing, we proceeded with the
overall analysis of the main effect of condition with the main effect of SDO on Perceived
Individual Power. Variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of
homogeneity of variance (p = .231).
Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis one was
conducted. No main effect was observed for condition by individual power, F(2, 342) =
.525, p = .592, partial η2 = .003. There was a significant main effect for SDO on
Perceived Individual Power, F(1, 342) = 10.005, p = .002, partial η2 = .028. Indicating
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overall, as SDO increased, perceived Individual Power Scores decreased. Moreover, there
was no significant 2-way interaction between condition by SDO for Perceived Individual
Power, F(2, 342) = .631, p = .533, partial η2 = .004. Essentially, we see the main effect of
SDO on the dependent variable, similar to the other research questions addressed in this
study. However, again condition had no main effect on group power. We shifted to
examine the influence of overall Collective Self-Esteem on Individual Power (see Figure
22).
Further, as before, we included Overall Collective Self-Esteem in the model to
determine if it influenced the relationship between our independent variable of condition
on our dependent variable of Group Power. We first tested for homogeneity of the
regression slopes, F(2, 345) = .268, p = .765 indicating the interaction was not
statistically significant. When testing for normality among the standardized residuals for
each Condition by Collective Self Esteem were normally distributed as indicated by
Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05). Further, we tested for homoscedasticity before testing the
complete model (see Figure 23). As shown in Figure 24, all three conditions appear to
have homoscedasticity requiring no data transformation to proceed.
Having met all preassessment of normality and homogeneity, we proceeded with
the overall test of the model between Condition by Collective Self-Esteem in predicting
Perceived individual Power. In testing the overall model, there was no significant main
effect for condition by Perceived Individual Power, F(2, 342) = 1.833, p = .162, partial η2
= .011. Additionally, Collective Self-Esteem did contribute to the main effect in
predicting Individual Power, F(1, 342) = 31.618, p = .000, partial η2 = .011.
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Figure 21 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Perceived Individual Power Scale by
Condition by Social Dominance Orientation for White Stigma

Figure 22 - Scatterplot of Perceived Individual Power by Condition and Social
Dominance Orientation for White Stigma
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Figure 23 - Grouped Scatterplot by condition of Perceived Individual Power by
Condition for Collective Self Esteem for White Stigma

Figure 24 - Scatterplot of Individual Power as Predicted by Condition and Overall
Collective Self-Esteem for White Stigma
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However, Higher Collective Self-Esteem scores were inversely related to Individual
Power Scores. Moreover, there was not a significant 2-way interaction for Condition by
Collective Self Esteem in predicting Individual Power, F(2, 342) = .266, p = .766, partial
η2 = .002, (see Figure 24).
Therefore, based on this model, the condition did not contribute significant
overall variance in predicting Perceived Individual Power. Additionally, Collective Self
Esteem had a main effect on Individual Power. Nevertheless, there was no significant 2way interaction between the conditions and perceived individual power as moderated by
overall collective self-esteem. Therefore, we fail to reject the null. Throughout the
analysis of this study, there was no main effect of condition, yet there were individual
difference moderators that predicted many of the dependent variables. This likely
indicates that the condition had little to no effect overall.
Study Two
For study two, we examined a high-status group, which is also concealable. For
this study, we explored mainstream Christians, given their identity may not be apparent
when interacting with outgroup others. Therefore, we included two additional measures,
including an outness inventory, which asks participants to share their identity and beliefs
with non-Christians. As in study two, we again manipulated one's perceived majority
status as a Christian in the American context. The first sample was collected through
TurkPrime, while the second sample was collected through social media purposeful
snowball sampling of Christians. Power Analysis was conducted before the study
assuming small effect sizes (α = .05, two-tailed) with an expected beta of β ≥ .14 and f2 ≥
.02 per the effect size thresholds (Cohen, 1988). Again, literature exists related to

85
minority or low-status experiences of Stigma. This research project tested similar
assumptions of high-status individuals and therefore served as a new area of exploration.
Assuming a medium effect size, the estimated required sample size was 150 in detecting
the effect. Power analysis was conducted utilizing G Power. We used mean-centered
values of moderators to test interaction effects
The overall distribution of scores was first tested to determine if this study met the
parametric assumption (Tukey, 1977). All measures were near or within acceptable limits
for reliability (see table 4). To adjust for the extreme outliers and based on Hoaglin &
Iglewicz (1987), we transformed outliers using a different process observed in study one.
This approach takes the highest value and makes a mathematical adjustment by
tightening the distribution tails and extreme outliers. While we may still violate normality
by tightening the tails, we can proceed with the parametric assumption in our analysis,
assuming each test is evaluated for normality and linearity (Osborne & Overbay, 2008;
Hoaglin. Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986). We removed 13 partially completed cases to ensure
no miscalculation or odd outliers as we proceed with the analysis. We continued with
analysis with the adjusted scores following the case wise deletion.

H1: When Christians are led to believe that their group is losing its numeric
majority, participants will report higher group stigma as compared to those who
perceive their group majority to stay constant.
As is the case in Study One, we replicated the same statistical tests except in Study Two;
we have most measures mathematically adjusted to address some of the extreme
skewness in observed measurement, both positive and negative.
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Table 4 - Inter-item Reliabilities of Measures Used for Christians

Cronbach's
Scale
Alpha
Collective Self Esteem
0.895
Membership selfesteem
0.777
Private collective selfesteem
0.803
Public collective selfesteem
0.721
Importance to Identity
0.860
Social Dominance
Orientation
0.993
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
0.914
Quick Discrimination Index
0.933
Individual Power
0.878
Group Power
0.869
Emotion Measure
0.792
Stigma Measure Christian
0.949
Outness (Christian Only)
0.834
Concealment Scale
(Christian Only)
0.898

Cronbach's
Alpha Based
on
Standardized
Items
0.897

N of
Items
16

0.776

4

0.807

4

0.727
0.864

4
4

0.934
0.919
0.930
0.879
0.869
0.793
0.957
0.846

16
10
30
8
8
12
36
9

0.914

10
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There was no significant main effect of condition on perceived stigma, F(2, 313) = .220,
p = .803, partial η2 = .001. We further explored a 2-way interaction between Stigma by
Condition and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO).
To test preliminary parametric assumptions, homogeneity of regression slopes as
the interaction term was not statistically significant, F(2, 310) = 2.644, p =.073, partial η2
= .017, it did approach statistical significance. As an additional test of normality for
within-group residuals, normality was tested for each condition. As expected, based on
our earlier checks of normality, all three conditions violated normality for group residuals
(p < .05). While we did not meet the assumption of random assignment, the proportions
of observations are similar enough that analysis can continue given the extreme variables
were removed (Huitema, 2011). Each condition was slightly positively skewed following
the case-wise deletion and transformation. General Linear Modeling assumes that the
variance of the residuals is equal for all groups of the independent variable. If the
variances are unequal, this can affect the Type I error rate. This requires a final test of the
overall homogeneity of variances was conducted and confirmed (p = .845), as noted in
Figure 25. There was homoscedasticity, as determined by visual inspection of the
standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as seen in Figure 25. We also
tested for Equity of Error Variances using Levene's, which met the threshold (p > .726).
To test the hypothesis and including Social Dominance Orientation in the model,
we first tested the main effect of the condition. There was not a significant main effect,
F(2, 310) = .084, p = .920, partial η2 = .001. Moreover, there was a main effect of Social
Dominance Orientation on Stigma, F(1, 310) = 5.171, p = .024, partial η2 = .016. This
indicates as SDO increases, Stigma scores increase overall. Regarding the 2-way, we
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observed the same F-statistic as observed with the homogeneity of regression slopes, F(2,
310) = 2.644, p = .073, partial η2 = .017, which was not statistically significant (see
Figure 26).
These findings suggested that SDO has the main effect on Stigma but does not
moderate one's stigma score when manipulating their perceived loss in status. In addition
to SDO, we examined the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on perceived
Christian Stigma. We conducted a test of homogeneity of variances utilizing Levene's test
(p = .605). Again there was no main effect by condition, F(2, 310) = .366, p = .694,
partial η2 = .002. There was a main effect for collective self-esteem, F(1, 310) = 5.702, p
= .018, partial η2 = .018. There was no significant 2-way interaction for condition by
collective self-esteem, F(2, 342) = .109, p = .897, partial η2 = .001 (see Figure 28).
Based on these findings, it appears that SDO has a main effect on Stigma but does not
moderate one's stigma score when manipulating their perceived loss in status. In addition
to SDO, we examined the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on perceived
Christian Stigma. We conducted a test of homogeneity of variances utilizing Levene's test
of homogeneity of variance (p = .613). There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual
inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values. (see Figure
27).
Returning to hypothesis testing, again there was no main effect by condition, F(2,
310) = .366, p = .694, partial η2 = .002. There was a main effect for collective self-esteem
by Christian stigma, F(1, 310) = 5.702, p = .018, partial η2 = .018.
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Figure 25 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Stigma Transformed with Social
Dominance Orientation for Christians

Figure 26 - Scatterplot of Stigma by Social Dominance Orientation (Transformed) for
Christians
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This would indicate that as collective self-esteem increases, so too does perceived
stigma. There was no significant 2-way interaction for condition by collective selfesteem, F(2, 310) = .109, p = .897, partial η2 = .001 (see Figure 28).

H2: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, we expect increased prejudice toward low-status outgroups
compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant.
In examining the main effect of the condition by the Quick Discrimination Index (QDI), a
high score on QDI suggests lower discriminatory attitudes toward outgroups. No main
effect was observed for Condition by QDI, F(2, 316) = .162, p = .850, partial η2 = .001.
We first included the SDO Mean Centered values in the analysis. To ensure the
parametric assumption was met, we first tested the homogeneity of regression slopes to
ensure no relationship. It was observed that there was no significant relationship between
the regression slopes as indicated, F(2, 313) = .291, p = .748, partial η2 = .002. Further,
we conducted a test of the normal distribution of residuals. The residuals violated
normality, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilks (p < .05). Yet, the variability of the residuals
approached the threshold and can still be analyzed utilizing linear parametric analysis in
plotting the standardized residuals as a test of homoscedasticity. We plotted the observed
versus the predicted residuals (see Figure 29).
There was heteroscedasticity, as observed in Figure 29. This is a natural pattern
with more restricted variability for higher scorers (Judd et al., 2009; Osborne & Overbay,
2008), and the data has already been transformed.
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Figure 27 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Standardized Residuals of Stigma for
Christians

Figure 28 - Scatterplot of Christian Stigma by Condition for Collective Self-Esteem for
Christians
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Therefore, we examined any extreme outliers within the data. While SPSS
detected some outliers among the standardized residual values (n=10), they were close
enough to the three and a half standard deviation threshold to proceed with the analysis.
Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis was
conducted. There was no significant main effect for condition for QDI, F(2, 313) = 1.546,
p = .215, partial η2 = .010. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is a significant predictor
of QDI, F(1, 313) = 220.264, p = .000, partial η2 = .413. This finding indicates that as
SDO scores increase, QDI scores decrease. There is not a significant two-way interaction
for condition by SDO, F(2, 313) = .291 , p = .748, partial η2 = .002 (see Figure 31).
Further, we examined the moderating influence of Collective Self-Esteem on QDI
between conditions. First, we tested to determine if there was a linear relationship
between QDI and Collective Self Esteem. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as
the interaction term was not statistically significant, but at the threshold for significance,
F(2, 313) = 3.027, p = .050. We tested the standardized residuals. The conditions were
normally distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05). There was
homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted
against the predicted values (Figure 31).
At least ten participants had extreme values with standardized residuals greater
than ±3.5 standard deviations in examining outliers. We selected those who were between
3.2 standard deviations above or below the mean. Returning to the test of the hypothesis,
we examined the main effect and 2-way interaction. When including Collective SelfEsteem in the model, no main effect was observed for condition, F(2, 303) = 2.646, p =
.073, partial η2 = .018.
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Figure 29 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Social Dominance Orientation by the
Quick Discrimination Index for Christians

Figure 30 - Scatterplot of the Quick Discrimination Index by Condition and Social
Dominance Orientation for Christians
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Further, there was a main effect of Collective Self-Esteem, F(2, 303) = 6.657, p =
.011, partial η2 = .027. Conversely there was a significant 2-way interaction between
condition and Collective Self-Esteem, F(2, 303) = 4.105, p = .017, partial η2 = .027. To
further decompose the main effects via pairwise comparisons, there were no significant
differences between conditions by Collective Self Esteem (p > .05). A significant
negative correlation was detected within the Almost No Loss Condition (r = -.374, p <
.001) but for the other two conditions, there were no significant relationships detected.
Further, the pairwise decomposition of the conditions did not rise to the threshold of
statistical significance (p > .05). We then shifted to testing emotion as the independent
variable in the model.

H3: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric
majority status but where they have likely had hierarchical and social power (were
once high status) and by extension have likely enjoyed some successful
confrontations with other groups; we expect higher anger than sadness.
We asked participants to report on which groups they associated with specific emotions.
Many of the participants skipped these items, as observed in study one. The following
data reported are for those who indicated which groups they associated with specific
emotions. We summed the number of groups by the associated emotions. To examine the
differences in the group with emotion frequencies, we utilized a nonparametric test of
difference. Given this design and the variability of the number of groups associated with
each emotion, we used The Kruskal-Wallis H test (sometimes called the "one-way
ANOVA on ranks").
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Figure 31 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition of Quick Discrimination Index by
Collective Self-Esteem for Christians

Figure 32 - Scatterplot of the Quick Discrimination Index by Condition and Collective
Self-Esteem for Christians
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While we tested which groups were associated with anger and sadness the most,
we also included other emotion variables listed in Study One. There were no significant
differences detected for most comparisons of conditions for emotion by target group (see
Table 5). The only exception was the differences between conditions for liberal groups by
sadness, where the loss condition experienced a floor effect compared to the control
condition. This rank comparison was significant (see Table 6 and Figures 33).
These figures suggest that the loss condition showed minimal variability, while
the control condition showed a large degree of variability, both including extreme outliers
in the model. While there appeared to be a significant difference between conditions for
conservative groups for perceived indifference (meaning they experience no emotion one
way or another), further decomposition of differences only approached significance (see
Table 7). Therefore, we fail to reject the null for the variable of emotion by condition,
indicating that the manipulation had little to no effect on perceived emotions toward
political groups, either liberal or conservative. In the next section, we explored the
differences between conditions for individual self-esteem.

H4: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they will show lower individual self-esteem.
Again, returning to parametric analysis, we explored the main effect of condition on
individual self-esteem as measured by Rosenberg's Individual Self-Esteem Scale. To test
preliminary parametric assumptions, the initial normality testing observed that the
conditions of almost no loss condition and control were normally distributed as assessed
by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05) while violating normality for the loss condition (p < .05).
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Table 5 - Nonparametric Hypothesis Test Summary for Liberal versus Conservative
Groups by Emotion for Christians

Null Hypothesis
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Happiness is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Happiness is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Sadness is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Sadness is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Emotionally Torn
is the same across categories
of condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Emotionally Torn is the same
across categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Interest is the same
across categories of condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Interest is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Anger is the same
across categories of condition.

Test
IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

Sig.
0.946

Decision
Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.697

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.041

Reject the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.777

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.668

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.794

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test
IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.165

Retain the
null
hypothesis.
Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.665

0.897

Retain the
null
hypothesis.
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Table 5 Continued
Null Hypothesis
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Anger is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Fear is the same
across categories of condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by Fear
is the same across categories
of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Not Familiar is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by Not
Familiar is the same across
categories of condition.
The distribution of Liberal
Groups by Indifferent is the
same across categories of
condition.
The distribution of
Conservative Groups by
Indifferent is the same across
categories of condition.

Test

Sig.

Decision

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.936

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test
IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.148

Retain the
null
hypothesis.
Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.765

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.760

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.024

Reject the
null
hypothesis.

IndependentSamples KruskalWallis Test

0.421

Retain the
null
hypothesis.

0.772
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Table 6 - Pairwise Comparisons of Condition for Christians

Std.
Test
Std.
Test
Statistic
Error Statistic
-15.256 10.469
-1.457

Adj.
Sig.a
0.435

Sample 1-Sample 2
Sig.
Loss Condition0.145
Almost no loss
condition
Loss Condition-24.051 9.585
-2.509
0.012
0.036
Control
Almost no loss
-8.796 10.315
-0.853
0.394
1.000
condition-Control
Each row tests the null hypothesis that Sample 1 and Sample 2 distributions
are the same.
Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance
level is .05.
a. The Bonferroni correction for multiple tests has adjusted significance
values.

Figure 33 - Boxplot by Condition for Sadness Toward Liberally Affiliated Groups for
Christians
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Table 7 - Pairwise Comparisons of Condition for Christians
Pairwise Comparisons of Condition
Std.
Test
Std.
Test
Adj.
Sample 1-Sample 2 Statistic Error Statistic
Sig.
Sig.a
Control-Loss
26.797 11.570
2.316
0.021
0.062
Condition
Control-Almost no
29.158 12.452
2.342
0.019
0.058
loss condition
Loss Condition-2.361 12.637
-0.187
0.852
1.000
Almost no loss
condition
Each row tests the null hypothesis that Sample 1 and Sample 2
distributions are the same.
Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance
level is .05.
a. The Bonferroni correction for multiple tests has adjusted significance
values.
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The normality was violated due to extreme outliers below the mean and one above the
mean. This is due to positive kurtosis, yet only one value exceeded the outlier threshold.
However, given the variability still follows a parametric distribution, we continued with
our analysis to make adjustments later based on extreme outliers as moderators.
However, there was no main effect for condition on individual self-esteem, F(2, 312) =
.133, p = .875. Based on this finding, there is not a significant main effect for condition
by individual self-esteem. Further, as a test of the interaction between the covariate of
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the condition variable, homogeneity of
regression slopes was tested. There was homogeneity of regression slopes as the
interaction term was not statistically significant, F(2, 343) = .089, p = .915, meaning we
have met the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes permitting additional
normality testing before conducting further parametric analysis
Standardized residuals were generated to test for normality of within-group
residuals. As observed in our initial normality test, two of the three groups met the
normality assumption of within-group residuals as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p >
.05). At the same time, the loss condition exceeded the limits for a normal distribution
due to the same outliers observed before. Given the small number of residuals and the
robust nature of a One-Way ANCOVA, we proceeded with the analysis (Osborne &
Overbay, 2008). Further, we explored the homoscedasticity of error variances for each
group. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized
residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 35).
Thirteen cases exceed ±3 standard deviations, while four are extreme values.
Based on the odd variability of these scores, we opted to delete each of these cases to pull
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the tails of the distribution toward the mean and what appeared to be some missing
responses in other measures. Once these four cases were removed, we proceeded to test
the moderating influence of SDO on Collective Self-Esteem by Condition. The one-way
ANCOVA assumes that the variance of the residuals is equal for all groups of the
independent variable. We tested for homogeneity of variances was assessed by Levene's
test of homogeneity of variance. There was homogeneity of variances (p = .420).
Having met all prerequisites for analysis, we tested the hypothesis through the
main effect and 2-way interaction. When including SDO in the model, there was no main
effect for condition, F(2, 305) = .072, p = .930, partial η2 = .000 in predicting Individual
Self-Esteem. Further, there was no main effect of SDO F(1, 305) = 1.250, p = .265,
partial η2 = .004. Conversely there was no significant 2-way interaction between
condition and SDO, F(2, 305) = .580, p = .561, partial η2 = .004, (see Figure 35).
Therefore, SDO appears not to predict individual self-esteem as a main effect or when
including the conditions.
In exploring the moderating effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Individual Self-Esteem,
we tested if there was homogeneity of regression slopes. Again, the parametric
assumption was tested. Testing preliminary parametric assumptions, there was
homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically significant,
F(2, 305) = .580, p = .561. Standardized residuals for the interventions were normally
distributed, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05) for the almost no loss condition
and the control condition.
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Figure 34 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale for
Christians

Figure 35 - Social Dominance Orientation by Condition and Rosenberg's Individual Self
Esteem Scale for Christians
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However, the loss condition was not normally distributed, similar to SDO. However,
while eleven outliers were observed, none were excessive, and therefore we kept the
cases for this analysis given the robustness of the two-way ANCOVA. There was
homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted
against the predicted values (see Figure 36). Homoscedasticity was assessed by
inspecting the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values, as indicated in
Figure 36. Further, we met the threshold of Equity of Error Variances (p = .600).
Having met the preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of hypothesis was
conducted. There was no main effect for condition by Individual Self-Esteem, F(2, 305)
= .381, p = .684, partial η2 = .002. There was a significant main effect for Collective SelfEsteem on Individual Self-Esteem, F(1, 305) = 1.391, p = .012, partial η2 = .012. This
finding indicates as Collective Self-Esteem increases, Individual Self-Esteem slightly
decreases. Moreover, there was no significant 2-way interaction between condition by
Collective Self-Esteem for Individual Self-Esteem, F(2, 305) = .800, p = .450, partial η2
= .005 (see Figure 37). Primarily, we see the main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on the
dependent variable. Nevertheless, again condition had no main effect on Individual SelfEsteem. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis for research question four.
H5: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status,
they will perceive themselves to lose group power.
As in study one, we explored participant perceptions of group power, asking
participants to reflect on their Christian group identity. We explored the main effect of
condition on group power and the moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation
(SDO) and Overall Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived Group Power.
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Figure 36 - Group Scatterplot by Condition for Rosenberg's Self-Esteem for Christians

Figure 37 - Scatterplot of Collective Self-Esteem by Rosenberg's Individual Self-Esteem
for Christians
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We first conducted an initial analysis of the overall main effect of condition on group
power. The initial test of equity of error variances met the threshold using Levene's at (p
> .05) to test preliminary parametric assumptions. There was no initial overall main effect
of condition on group power, F(2, 308) = .026, p = .975, partial η2 = .000. We further
explored the moderating influence of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) between
condition and group power. In testing for homogeneity of regression slopes as the
interaction term, the statistical term was not significant, F(2, 305) = .083, p = .921.
Having met the linearity assumption, we further explored any significant
divergent residuals from the predictive model to ensure we have met all parametric
assumptions before proceeding. Standardized residuals for the interventions were
normally distributed for all conditions, as assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05).
Moreover, we explored homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the
standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 38).
To assess the normality of the residuals of the overall model, the Shapiro-Wilk
test was conducted, including all residuals together. The overall model met the threshold
for normality (p > .05). At least eleven small value outliers were assessed in the data, as
assessed by standardized residuals greater than ±3.5 standard deviations. Yet, none were
extensive, and due to the robustness of the two-way analysis of variance, we continued
with the outliers in the model when including SDO. We then proceeded to the overall
analysis of the main effect of Condition by SDO in predicting Group Power.
In testing the hypothesis, no main effect of condition was observed when
predicting group power, F(2, 305) = .110, p = .896, partial η2 = .001. There was a
significant main effect of SDO on Group Power, F(1, 305) = 27.996, p = .000, partial η2
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= .084. These findings indicate as SDO increases, perceived Group Power decreases
which may challenge the current trends in the literature. There was no significant
interaction between condition by SDO for prediction of Group Power, F(2, 305) = .083, p
= .921, partial η2 = .001. As observed in study one, SDO predicts perceived group power
while condition had no main effect or significant interaction when including SDO as a
moderator (see Figure 39).
Further, we explored the moderating influence of Collective Self-Esteem on
perceived Group Power. To test preliminary parametric assumptions, we ran an initial test
for the homogeneity of the regression slopes, F(2, 305) = .567, p = .568, indicating the
interaction was not statistically significant. When testing for normality among the
standardized residuals for each Condition by Collective Self Esteem, the data were
normally distributed as indicated by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05). We then tested for
homoscedasticity before testing the complete model, including Collective Self-Esteem as
a moderator (see Figure 40).
Homoscedasticity was determined through a visualization assessment of Figure 40.
Following tests of linearity and normality, we further explored the main effects of the
condition and collective self-esteem on perceived group power. Having met the
preliminary statistical assumptions, the test of the hypothesis was conducted. There was
no main effect of condition by perceived group power, F(2, 305) = .268, p = .765, partial
η2 = .002. Further, collective self-esteem had no effect on group power, F(1, 305) = .006,
p = .939, partial η2 = .000 nor was there a significant interaction between collective selfesteem by condition in predicting group power, F(2, 305) = .567, p = .568, partial η2 =
.004, (see Figure 41).
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Figure 38 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Perceived Group Power for Christians

Figure 39 - Social Dominance Orientation and Perceived Group Power by Condition for
Christians
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Therefore, based on the findings of the test of these three models, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis. From group power, we shifted to test perceived individual power.
This was to determine if individuals personally feel empowered based on their group
membership instead of the individual's perceived power within the group overall.

H6: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they will perceive themselves to lose individual power measured
by an individual measure of power.
We first explored the main effect of conditions on perceived individual power. We tested
to ensure the parametric assumption was met. We initially tested the overall Equity of
Error Variances using Levene's. All conditions met the threshold at (p > .05). There was
no overall main effect for Condition by Perceived individual Power, F(2, 305) = 1.082, p
= .340, partial η2 = .007. In continuation of examining the potential moderating influence
of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Collective Self Esteem, we again examined
if these measures contributed to the prediction of the overall model and two-way
interaction per each moderator within the model. We tested for homogeneity of
regression slopes.
The interaction term was not significant for individual power, F(2, 305) = .375, p
= .687. We further examined if the standardized residuals were normally distributed. The
standardized residuals were normally distributed for the control and loss conditions, as
assessed by Shapiro-Wilk's test (p > .05). In contrast, the almost no loss condition did not
meet the threshold for normal distribution.
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Figure 40 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Perceived Group Power for Christians

Figure 41 - Scatterplot of Perceived Group Power by Collective Self-Esteem and
Condition for Christians
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This was partially due to a negative distribution of the almost no loss condition.
Six total outliers were observed, but given the distribution did not exceed ±3.5 standard
deviations, we continued with those cases in the subject pool. There was
homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted
against the predicted values (see Figure 42). Given we were either close or within
acceptable limits of normality testing, we proceeded with the overall analysis of the main
effect of condition with the main effect of SDO on Perceived Individual Power.
Variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance (p
= .378).
To test the hypothesis, there was no main effect observed for condition by
perceived individual power, F(2, 305) = 1.168, p = .312, partial η2 = .008. Further, in
exploration of SDO on perceived individual power no main effect was observed, F(1,
305) = 3.310, p = .070, partial η2 = .011. Additionally, there was no significant 2-way
interaction between for condition by SDO in predicting perceived individual power, F(2,
305) = .375, p = .687, partial η2 = .002. It is important to note that with a larger sample,
we might have detected the main effect of SDO on perceived individual power (see
Figure 43).
Additionally, as a test of our second moderator, we examined if Collective SelfEsteem overall would moderate a relationship between condition and perceived
individual power. To test the parametric assumption, we conducted a homogeneity of the
regression slopes, F(2, 305) = 3.934, p = .021 indicating a significant interaction. Given
that homogeneity was violated, we were unable to proceed with parametric/linear
analysis using ANCOVA.
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Figure 42 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Perceived Individual Power for
Christians

Figure 43 - Scatterplot of Perceived Individual Power by Social Dominance Orientation
and Condition for Christians
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Shifting to nonparametric ANCOVA testing of the overall moderating influence
of Collective Self-Esteem, Quade's test of nonparametric ANCOVA was used. This test
uses assigned ranks derived from residuals when including non-normal or correlated
slopes (Garcia, Fernandez, Luengo, & Herreram, 2010; Quade, 1979).
There was no significant interaction in testing the hypothesis, Fq(2, 308) = .587, p
= .556 between the conditions when including overall Collective Self-Esteem as a
moderator. Therefore, different decomposition by condition was not warranted. Based on
these findings, it appears there is no main effect of condition on individual power even
when including the moderators of SDO or Collective Self Esteem.
For Study Two, and unlike Study One, which focused on White Male Identity,
Study Two explored the concealment and disclosure of Christian Identity, which can be
hidden if one so chooses. Therefore, we included two additional research questions
related to concealment and disclosure.

H7: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they will be more likely to conceal their Christian beliefs.
Our seventh hypothesis addresses one's motivation to conceal. We first tested for the
normality of the conditions for which all violated the normality assumption. This was due
to a significant number of extreme outliers, (n = 21; p < .000). Therefore, to examine the
primary main effects were determined using Kruskal Wallis-H, a nonparametric ranksbased analysis. No significant differences were observed, H(3) = .736, p = .692 among
the conditions (See Figure 44).
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Given that normality was violated, we conducted two tests of Quade's Test of
Nonparametric ANCOVA was used, Fq(2, 311) = .328, p = .721 between the conditions
when including Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator. Given that there is no significant
interaction, we did not conduct an additional decomposition analysis for CSE. We further
examined if Collective Self-Esteem moderates the relationship between Condition by
Concealment. Utilizing the same test for Collective Self-Esteem, there was no difference
between conditions, Fq(2, 311) = .528, p = .590 between the conditions when including
Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator. Again, decomposition was not warranted for this
study. Therefore, it appears that condition had little to no influence on one's perceived
need to conceal their Christian identity from others. We then shifted to self-disclosure as
the dependent variable.

H8: To the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they will be less likely to disclose their Christian beliefs to others.
We first examined the overall main effect of condition on disclosure or one's willingness
to share their identity with others, close, familiar individuals to strangers. The initial tests
of normality violated the normality assumption; however, only six cases were detected as
outliers across conditions, with three observed in the almost no loss condition and three
detected in the control condition, indicating a positive skew within each. However, these
values were not extreme for detecting an overall main effect of the condition. To test
preliminary parametric assumptions, we also tested for homogeneity of regression slopes
for which the interaction term was not significant, F(1, 306) = 1.202, p = .302, allowing
us to proceed with qualification tests of normality and linearity.
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Figure 44 - Kruskal-Wallis Test for Condition by Concealment for Christians
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The standardized residuals also violated normality, as indicated by Shapiro Wilk's test (p
< .008). As a result, we removed four extreme outliers to address this skewness and
continued with our analysis. These values exceeded residuals greater than ±3.5 standard
deviations. There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual inspection of the
standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see Figure 45). We further
met the Equality of Error Variances threshold as indicated by Levene’s (p = .550). This
led to the overall testing of the model, including SDO as a moderator.
In testing the hypothesis, no significant main effect was observed by condition for
the measure of disclosure, F(2, 311) = 3.140, p = .152, partial η2 = .012. We further tested
the moderators of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) as well as Collective Self
Esteem. When predicting disclosure including SDO within the model by condition there
was no main effect of condition when controlling for SDO, F(2, 311) = .504, p = .605,
partial η2 = .003. There was no main effect for SDO when controlling for condition, F(1,
311) = .631, p = .428, partial η2 = .002. Further, while Figure 46 seems to indicate an
interaction, there is no significant statistical interaction present in the model, F(2, 311) =
1.202, p = .302, partial η2 = .008, (see Figure 46).
We further tested for Collective Self-Esteem as a moderator of disclosure. There
was homogeneity of regression slopes as the interaction term was not statistically
significant, F(2, 302) = .144, p = .866. Additionally, four outliers were detected, creating
a negatively skewed distribution. The values are around ±3.5 standard deviations, and
therefore we can proceed with the analysis. Further, homoscedasticity was observed by
visual inspection of the standardized residuals plotted against the predicted values (see
Figure 47).
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Figure 45 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Social Dominance Orientation for
Christians

Figure 46 - Disclosure by Condition for Social Dominance Orientation for Christians
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Variances were homogeneous, as assessed by Levene's test of homogeneity of variance (p
= .567). We were, therefore, able to test the model of the influence of Collective SelfEsteem's influence on the relationship between Condition by Disclosure. There was no
significant main effect observed for condition, F(1, 302) = 1.688, p = .187, partial η2 =
.011.
There was a significant main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Disclosure when
controlling for condition, F(1, 302) = 14.000, p = .000, partial η2 = .044. Further, there
was no significant interaction between condition by Collective Self-Esteem in predicting
disclosure, F(1, 302) = .144, p = .866, partial η2 = .001. Therefore, it appears that
collective self-esteem does predict or influence one's willingness to disclose to others. In
other words, those with higher collective self-esteem are more likely to disclose to others
(r = .224, p < .000) (see Figure 48). Based on the findings of Study Two, it appears that
condition had little to no effect on people's perceptions of Stigma, power, collective selfesteem, or concealment or disclosure. While individual differences exist related to these
trends indicated by the moderated effects, we fail to reject the null for all hypothesis
testing.
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Figure 47 - Grouped Scatterplot by Condition for Disclosure by Collective Self-Esteem
for Christians

Figure 48 - Scatterplot of Disclosure by Condition and Collective Self-Esteem for
Christians
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Chapter Five: General Discussion and Conclusion
This study explored whether high-status individual perceptions of stigma can be
influenced by perceived loss in status through a presentation of a false article that showed
a loss in one condition, almost no loss in the second condition, and control with no
display of the article. The measures either met or exceeded inter-item reliabilities, had
potentially enough of a sample per study to measure medium to small effects, and utilized
a series of individual tests of the dependent variables. This discussion section will
examine both studies together as comparisons between non-concealable versus
concealable groups.
The study focused on two specific targeted stratified convenience samples, White
Males and Christians, for studies one and two. It is important to note that the data was
collected in the 2018 calendar year following the election of US President Donald J.
Trump. Before the 2020 US Presidential Election events, this saw extensive and divisive
social tension, particularly in the southeastern US. The findings presented should be
considered within the sociological frame of those events of the time. As part of this
design, we carefully considered the use of a comparison group of low-status groups.
However, given the extensive research on low-status experiences of stigma, we
purposefully delineated our sample given the limited research on high-status perceptions
of stigma and the related correlates explored in this study. We could have never expected
the incredible changes in the social landscape of America before, during, or even
following the study. Nevertheless, such tensions appeared to exacerbate social tension
beyond anything we could have expected. The reader should be aware of the study's
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social, temporal, and cultural context in reviewing the findings to avoid misconceptions
or view the conclusions through the social-political lens following the 2021 presidential
election cycle.
In both studies, we attempted to manipulate individuals' perceptions of stigma. In
condition one, we presented an article that suggested that the reader's racial or religious
group was projected to lose majority status over time. In condition two, we indicated that
there would be little to no change in their majority status, and in condition three, no false
article was presented. Following those conditions, participants completed a series of
randomized questionaries on individual stigma, group stigma, perceived intergroup
prejudice, emotional reaction to various in and outgroups, individual self-esteem,
perceived group power, perceived individual power, and in study two measures of
identity concealment, and identity disclosure based on the current stigma literature.
Reliabilities were generated for all measures and all within acceptable thresholds for
inclusion in the study.
Goffman (1963) noted that stigmas are marks or indicators of difference,
separateness, or deviance from social or cultural norms. However, since Goffman's early
work, research has demonstrated the various ways stigma is applied to outgroups. For
example, some stigmas are apparent, while others are concealable. Inter-group
comparison is a common evaluative social cognitive process that infers and reinforces
personality and behavioral attributes simply based on outgroups' perceived normative
behavior regardless of individual differences (Crocker et al., 1998). Given this
complexity, we explored whether hierarchical thinking and collective self-esteem might
affect the perceived stigma of high-status or ingroup identity.
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In the test of hypothesis one, when white males are led to believe that their group
is losing its numeric majority, participants will report higher group stigma. It was
determined there was no main effect by condition. There was a main effect of social
dominance orientation on perceptions of stigma with no statistically significant
interaction detected. This appears to be a positive association between higher perceived
stigma with higher social dominance orientation scores. There was a negative association
between higher perceived stigma with higher collective self-esteem scores. In conducting
the same test for Christians in study two, we observed a similar trend: condition had no
main effect on perceived stigma. There was a main effect of social dominance orientation
on perceived stigma where higher perceived stigma scores were correlated to higher
social dominance orientation scores. The was a main effect of self-esteem on perceived
stigma scores; however, while visually there appeared to be an interaction, it was not a
statistically significant interaction by condition.
Given that these were high-status individuals, we also examined prejudicial
attitudes of high-status groups on outgroups as a potential dependant variable. If
individuals perceive themselves to be stigmatized, we explored if such perceived stigma
might enhance or inhibit prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups (Buss, 1996; Gray, 1987;
Higgins, 1997, 1998). Hypothesis two suggested that if individuals perceive themselves
to lose numeric majority status, we expected an increased prejudice toward low-status
outgroups compared to those who perceive their group majority to stay constant. We used
the Quick Discrimination Index (QDI) measure for this research question, where high
scores indicate more awareness, sensitivity, and receptivity to racial diversity and gender
equality, and lower scores indicate greater prejudice toward women and racial diversity.
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For study one, while not statistically significant, the QDI was close in meeting the
appropriate p-value for the main effect by condition. There was a significant main effect
of Social Dominance Orientation with QDI with a negative relationship between SDO
and QDI. When including Collective Self-Esteem in the model, the main effect for
condition indicated a potentially moderating influence on the model. Further, there was
also the main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on QDI as well. This positive relationship
indicated that the higher one's Collective self-esteem, the higher the QDI score. The loss
condition was significantly lower than the other two conditions indicating that perceived
loss may be more likely to influence their prejudicial attitudes toward others, particularly
when including collective self-esteem as a moderator. We replicated the same measures
and conditions for QDI for Christians. Again, there was no main effect of condition with
QDI. We again replicated a similar yet more pronounced effect for SDO with QDI.
Whereas SDO increases, QDI decreases. One difference between the two studies
occurred when including Collective Self-Esteem in the model with the condition by QDI.
There was no main effect observed for condition by QDI when including Collective SelfEsteem in the model for white males. We observed that the main effect of collective selfesteem on QDI was in the loss condition as collective self-esteem increased, so too did
QDI scores, while in the almost no loss condition and control was negatively associated
for Christians. While these differences were not statistically significant, a significant
positive association was detected in the loss condition. This was confirmed by a
significant two-way interaction as well.
Previous literature has shown there is an association between emotion and
experiences of stigmatization. Emotions serve as a reactive yet functional non-verbal of
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one's inner state (Maitner, Claypool, Mackie, & Smith, 2000). Further group-level
comparisons appear to drive appraisals between one's ingroup and outgroups. Moreover,
emotions provide a group signal of members' inclusivity and offer insight into how
groups find synergistic attitudes toward each other and outgroups. Therefore, studying
group level, emotional associations offer potential in understanding group cohesion,
particularly when others stigmatize the group outside of the group. Anger is associated
with successful outcomes of conflict, while sadness is associated with unsuccessful
outcomes of conflict (Mackie et al., 2000; Dijker & Koomen, 2003; Bos, Kok, & Dijker,
2001; Feldman & Crandall, 2007). In testing hypothesis three, we predicted that if
individuals perceive themselves to lose a numeric majority status but have likely had
hierarchical and social power (were once high status), we expect higher anger than
sadness given their former high status. In exploring white males, neither anger nor
sadness was significantly different between conditions within our study. This was
replicated for Christians where neither anger nor sadness was significantly different. We
did observe at least in the control condition that sadness perceptions toward liberal
groups showed greater variability overall than the other two conditions, meaning that
variability differed by condition for sadness where the scores were low with little to no
variability in comparing the other two conditions. However, while an interesting finding,
the statistical thresholds were not met for reporting, and therefore, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis for emotion.
Another replicated finding from the literature on stigma is that low-status groups
generally have lower self-esteem when primed with their identity prior to completing
various tasks. When a study participant is reminded of their group identity, which is a
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stigmatized group, they are more likely to do more poorly on knowledge tasks than those
who are not primed by their identity, particularly when the task is stereotypically
associated with negative outcomes for that particular group. As noted, many individuals
derive self-value from group membership, and therefore stigma can potentially impact
one's individual and group self-esteem. Based on this current literature, we tested
hypothesis four that explored if individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric majority
status or show lower individual self-esteem. For white males, there was no main effect of
condition on individual self-esteem. There was a main effect of SDO on Individual SelfEsteem, indicating higher SDO scores are correlated with lower individual self-esteem.
Additionally, one interesting finding was that there was a main effect of collective selfesteem on individual self-esteem but negatively, meaning that as collective self-esteem
increased, individual self-esteem slightly decreased. This is counter-intuitive as one
might expect both to increase linearly, but a decrease was observed. Differences between
the two studies were observed. While we replicated the finding for Christians of no main
effect of condition on individual self-esteem, we did not observe a main effect of SDO on
individual self-esteem. We did replicate a similar main effect negative trend for
Christians on Collective Self-Esteem with Individual Self-Esteem.
Another potential variable of interest in this study was a perceived loss of group
and individual power. From a theoretical perspective, as one loses power and resources,
they are more likely to perceive other competing groups as threatening. One's perceived
power can change their inner state as well as the inner states of others. Powerless
individuals see their perceived loss of power as reminders to ensure conformity to
dominant norms based on need and access, not a person's motivation to change behavior
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or their ability to make decisions. If one perceives themselves to have limited power, they
are more prone to threat as well as have more variable emotional states (Keltner et al.,
2003; Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keating, 1988; Gruenfeld, 1995; Sutton &
Davidson, 1997). This premise leads to hypothesis five, which proposed that if
individuals perceive themselves to lose majority status, they will perceive themselves to
lose group power. For white males, there was no main effect of condition on perceived
group power. There was a significant main effect of SDO on perceived group power
indicated by a negative relationship. This would suggest that those with higher group
power would be more likely to show lower SDO scores which is the inverse of what one
might predict. In other words, if one perceives themselves to have higher perceived group
power, they are less likely to score higher on SDO. There was no main effect of
collective self-esteem on perceived group power. For Christians, there was not the main
effect of condition on perceived group power. There was a main effect of SDO on
perceived group power with a negative relationship similar to the trend observed with
white males. There again was no main effect of Collective Self-Esteem on Perceived
group power. A similar trend to that observed with white males.
In addition to group power, we also asked participants to complete a similar
measure adapted for their perceived individual power as part of a group. Therefore, we
proposed in hypothesis six that when individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they are more likely to perceive themselves to lose individual power. For
White Males, again, there was no main effect of condition on perceived individual power.
There was a main effect of SDO on perceived individual power. Whereas SDO increases
perceived individual power decreases. This could indicate those who prefer hierarchy
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may do so as a reaction to loss of power. There was no main effect of Collective SelfEsteem on perceived individual power for white males. In testing the same hypothesis in
study two on Christians, there was no significant main effect of condition on perceived
individual power. Unlike white males, there was no main effect observed among
Christians on SDO on individual power or collective self-esteem's main effect on
perceived individual power (see Table 7).
For study two, two additional measures were included, given that Christians can
conceal their identity compared to white males. Another distinction made in the stigma
literature is between concealable and non-concealable stigmas. While some markers of
one's group identity are difficult to conceal, others are less so. For example, a Jewish
individual may hide their ethnic identity more given the ambiguity of the physical
attributes that constitute Jewish identity. Therefore, those in concealable stigmatized
groups might have methods for controlling how outsiders perceive them and potentially
control how they are perceived. This provides a protective mechanism for outgroup selfesteem and individual benefit. How one chooses to disclose their identity gives some
insight into how stigmatized they might perceive themselves or their group (Crocker et
al., 1991; Major & Crocker, 1993; Aronson & Inzlicht, 2004).
We first tested to determine if individuals perceive themselves to lose numeric
majority status, they would be more likely to conceal their Christian beliefs. This served
as hypothesis seven in Study Two. Given the nature of the distributions observed, we
conducted a non-parametric analysis to detect differences and any moderating influences
of SDO and Collective self-esteem. No main effects of SDO or Collective Self-Esteem
were observed. Therefore, we failed to reject the null hypothesis. As a second focus of
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analysis, we tested hypothesis eight, which tested if individuals perceive themselves to
lose numeric majority status, they would be less likely to disclose their Christian beliefs
to others. We shifted back to parametric analysis for this test of the hypothesis. Using a
measure of identity disclosure adapted for Christians, we observed no main effect of
condition. Nor were main effects observed for SDO on disclosure or collective selfesteem on disclosure. Therefore, given these findings, it appears that neither concealment
nor disclosure is related to one's perceived loss of status (see Table 8).
Implication of Findings
While there were little to no findings regarding the experimental manipulation,
what was clear were the correlational and associational relationships between the
moderators and the various dependent variables included in the study for each question.
Of particular interest here was the use of Social Dominance Orientation, which correlated
both negatively and positively with the various dependent variables depending on the
direction of the summed Likert items of the scale. It appears the higher the perceived
Stigma scores, the more likely participants were to score higher on SDO. Conversely, if
participants scored higher on Stigma were more likely to score lower on Collective selfesteem. This finding indicates that high-status individuals who are white males or
Christians who perceive themselves as stigmatized are more likely to prefer hierarchical
social structures with power distributed to the upper socio-economic status and less
power given to lower social identity. Further, it appears there is a perception of lower
collective self-esteem for those who perceive themselves to be more stigmatized and
higher self-esteem for those with lower perceptions of Stigma, which would be expected.
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Table 8 - Hypothesis Testing Study One

Scale
Stigma Measure White
Quick Discrimination
Index

Emotion Measure
Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale
Group Power
Individual Power
Scale

Condition
Main
Effect?
No

Social
Dominance
Orientation
Yes

Collective
Direction
Selfof Effect Interaction Esteem
Positive No
Yes

Direction
of Effect
Positive

Interaction
No

Yes

Yes

Negative

Positive

No

No

NonParametric

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Negative

No
No
No

No

Yes
NonParametric

Negative
Negative
Negative

No
No
No

Yes
No
Yes

Negative
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Table 9 - Hypothesis Testing Study Two

Scale
Stigma Measure White
Quick Discrimination
Index
Emotion Measure
Rosenberg Self-Esteem
Scale
Group Power
Individual Power
Outness (Christian Only)
Concealment Scale
(Christian Only)

Condition
Main
Effect?
No

Social
Dominance
Orientation
Yes

Collective
Direction
Selfof Effect Interaction Esteem
Positive Almost
Yes

No

Negative

No

Yes
NonParametric

No
No
No
No

No
Yes
No
No

No

No

Negative

Direction
of Effect Interaction
Positive No

No

Yes
Positive
NonParametric

Yes

No
No
No
No

Yes
No
No

No

No

Negative

No
No
No
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Therefore, high-status white males and Christians who believe they are stigmatized prefer
social hierarchy and experience issues with collective self-esteem, which might explain
their need to rally and organize when traditional social hierarchies appear challenged.
This study also discovered a slight negative relationship between QDI (where
higher scores indicate less prejudice toward outgroups) and SDO but a large positive
linear association between Collective Self-Esteem and QDI. This would suggest that
higher SDO participants are more likely to be prejudiced while also exhibiting lower selfesteem. Again, traditional values and changes in the social landscape could be a factor in
their responses. This finding replicates previous research on the correlations between
SDO and prejudice, but the findings of collective self-esteem might explain some of the
antidotal trends of polarization in the United States before and following the elections.
As our emotional questions showed minimal to no effect through analysis, this
may be for two reasons. First, the design of the emotional questions may have proved
confusing for the research participant as they were first to associate which emotions they
associated with these groups. The odd variability of responses could mean that the
affective associations may be mixed given the complexity of perceptions about these
groups and individual experiences with outgroups either directly or through media
representations. In exploring individual self-esteem as a dependent variable, higher SDO
scores were negatively associated with lower individual self-esteem scores.
Counterintuitively, there was a negative relationship between Collective versus
Individual Self-Esteem. This could mean that high-status individuals are struggling with
their role in the perceived social changes in society; therefore, the negative correlation
might demonstrate the role ambiguity given the changing landscape of social norms.
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Further, preference for social hierarchy as measured by SDO may be one method for
keeping the status quo and push back on social and cultural reforms, indicating a need for
traditional hierarchical structure in the demographic landscape. The findings of collective
self-esteem may also be an indirect measure of collective affective synergy among highstatus members, which the individual may not fully comprehend or agree with the
changes in society.
In measuring perceived power, both group and individual power, we found that
higher SDO Scores are negatively associated with perceived group power. This would
further add support to the premise that loss of status may be felt collectively. High SDO
participants may see themselves as losing group power overall for both white males and
Christians, yet we observed no significant findings of collective self-esteem on group
power; therefore, additional research would need to explore this question of collective
affect and its role on group identity and cohesion when considering outgroup influence.
When considering individual perceived power, White Males showed a significant
association where higher SDO scores were associated with lower perceived individual
power. Yet, for Christians, no main effect was observed, and it is unclear why a
difference occurred between the two studies and warrants further examination.
Finally, given that Christian identity is concealable, we examined concealment and one's
willingness to disclose their identity to outgroup others. No significant main effects were
observed for concealment or disclosure. While we used online samples, it could be that
Christian identity does not create enough social tension to warrant concealment or
disclosure; therefore, these findings deviate from those observed with low-status groups.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Therefore, based on these findings, it appears that the manipulation had little to no
effect on the various dependent variables tested independently for each research question.
Further, Social Dominance Orientation and Collective Self-Esteem influenced many
dependent variables, meaning there are individual correlative differences that account for
perceptions of Stigma, prejudice, perceived power, and study two, disclosure. Further
research should explore what other potential correlates might impact one's perception of
stigma and related variables. Researchers should consider a more realistic experimental
manipulation when replicating or modifying this study. Alternatives to the false article
could include a video of a newscast staged to replicate the conditions. Another possibility
is to have a formal talk recorded and represented to participants replicating the content of
each of the fake articles.
While a controversial topic, it was selected as a common theme prevalent at least
in our cultural context of the Southeast United States was related to high-status
individuals' perceptions of Stigma based on their high-status identity. By better
understanding high-status perceptions on topics such as perceive Stigma, we can better
understand how these attitudes translate into their worldview and perception of outgroups
and the changing landscape of American politics. Moreover, as the political landscape
continues to change, a better understanding of high-status perceptions would help us
better address new challenges as they arise.

134
References
Allport, G.W. (1954) The nature of prejudice. Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday.
Anderson, C., John, O. P. & Keltner, D (2012). The personal sense of power. Journal of
Personality, 80(2), 313-344.
Aronson, J., and Inzlicht, M. (2004). The ups and downs of attributional ambiguity: stereotype
vulnerability and the academic self-knowledge of African American college students.
Psychological Science, 15, 829–836.
Astington, J. W. (2003). Sometimes necessary, never sufficient: False-belief understanding and
social competence. In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (Eds.), Individual differences in
theory of mind: Implications for typical and atypical development (pp. 14-39). New
York: Psychology Press.
Azumagakito, T., Suzuki, R. & Arita, T. (2013). Cyclic behavior in gene-culture coevolution
mediated by phenotypic plasticity in language. In Proceedings of the 12th European
Conference on Artificial Life, 617–624.
Bos, A. E. R., Kok, G., & Dijker, A. J. (2001). Public reactions to people with HIV/AIDS in the
Netherlands. AIDS Education and Prevention, 13, 219 – 228.
Bos, A. E. R., Pryor, J. B., Reeder, G. D. & Stutterheim, S. E. (2013) Stigma: Advances in
Theory and Research, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 35:1, 1-9.
Boyd, J. Otilingam, P. G., & Grajales, M. (2003). Internalized stigma of mental illness:
psychometric properties of a new measure. Psychiatry Research, 121(1), 31-49.
Bromley, D. G. (1998). The social construction of contested exit roles: defectors, whistleblowers,
and apostates.” In David G. Bromley, ed. The Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of
Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements. Westport, CT: Praeger
Publisher, pp. 19-48.
Brzezicki, D. L., & Major, B. (1983, April). Personality correlates of attractiveness:
Interpersonal orientation, self-confidence and gender role identity. Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Eastern Psychological Association, Philadelphia, PA.
Buss, D. M. (1996). Sexual conflict: Evolutionary insights into feminism and the ‘battle of the
sexes’. In D. M. Buss & N. Malamuth (Eds.), Sex, power, conflict: Evolutionary and
feminist perspectives (pp. 296–318). New York: Oxford University Press.
Byrne, D., & Nelson, D. (1965). Attraction as a linear function of proportion of positive
reinforcements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1(6), 659-663.
Caporael, L. R. & Baron, R. M. (1997). Groups as the mind’s natural environment. In J. Simpson
& D. Kenrick (Eds.), Evolutionary social psychology (pp. 317-343). Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Carli, L., LaFleur, S., & Loeber, C. (1995). Nonverbal behavior, gender, and influence. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 1030-1041.

135
Clifford, E., & Clifford, M. (1986). Social and psychological problems associated with clefts:
Motivations for cleft palate treatment. International Dental Journal, 36, 115-119
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates.
Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (1994). Origins of domain-specificity: The evolution of functional
organization. In L. Hirschfeld & S. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the Mind: Domainspecificity in cognition and culture. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Crocker, J., Major, B., & Steele, C. (1998). Social stigma. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G.
Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (pp. 504-553). New York, NY, US:
McGraw-Hill.
Crocker, J., Voelkl, K., Testa, M., & Major, B. (1991). Social stigma: The affective consequences
of attributional ambiguity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60(2), 218-228.
Crosby, F. (1984). The denial of personal discrimination. American Behavioral Scientist. 27 (3),
371-386.
Danbold, F. & Huo, Y. J. (2015). No longer “All-American”? Whites’ defensive reactions to their
numerical decline. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(2), 210-218.
Dijker, A. J. M., Koomen, W. (2003). Extending Weiner’s attribution-emotion model of
stigmatization of ill persons. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 25, 51–68.
Dovidio, J.F., Brown, C.E., Heltman, K., Ellyson, S.L., and Keating, C.F. (1988). Power displays
between women and men in discussions of gender-linked tasks: A multichannel study.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(4), 580-587.
Dumont, M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., Wigboldus, D., & Gordijn, E. (2003). Social categorization and fear
reactions to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 29, 112–123.
Emerson, R. M. (1962). Power-dependence relations, American Sociological Review, 27(1), 3141.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior
Research Methods, 39, 175-191.
Feldman, D. B., & Crandall, C. S. (2007). Dimensions of mental illness stigma: What about
mental illness causes social rejection? Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 26(2),
137-154.
Fischer, P., Fischer, J., Aydin, N., & Frey, D. (2010). Physically attractive social information
sources lead to increased selective exposure to information. Basic and Applied Social
Psychology, 32, 340-347.
Frable, D. E. S. (1993). Being and feeling unique: statistical deviance and psychological
marginality. Journal of Personality, 61(1), 85-110.

136
Frable, D. E., Blackstone, T., & Scherbaum, C. (1990). Marginal and mindful: deviants in social
interactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(1), 140-149.
Frijda, N. H., Markam, S., Sato, K., & Wiers, R. (1995). Emotions and emotion words. In J. A.
Russell, A.S.R. Marnstead, J. C. Wellenkamp, & J. M. Fernandez-Dols (Eds.), Everyday
conceptions of emotions (pp. 121-143). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer.
Gartner, J. D. (1986). Antireligious prejudice in admissions to doctoral programs in clinical
psychology. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 17(5), pp. 473-475.
Gigerenzer, G. (1997). The modularity of social intelligence. In Machiavellian intelligence II:
Extension and evaluation (Whiten A, Byrne RW, ed), pp 264-288. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Glick, P., Fiske, S. T., Mladinic, A, Saiz, J. L., Abrams, D., Masser, B., Adetoun, B., Osagie, J.
E., Akande, A., Alao, A., Brunner, A, Willemsen, T. M., Chipeta, K., Dardenne, B.,
Dijksterhuis, A., Wigboldus, D., Eckes T., Six-Materna I., Expósito F., Moya, M., Foddy,
M., Kim, H. J., Lameiras, M., Sotelo M. J., Mucchi-Faina A., Romani, M., Sakalli N.,
Udegbe, B., Yamamoto, M., Ui M, Ferreira, MC, López López, W. (2000). Beyond
prejudice as simple antipathy: hostile and benevolent sexism across cultures. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 762-775.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Gonyea, D. (2017). Majority of white Americans say they believe white face discrimination. You,
me and them: experiencing discrimination in America. National Public Radio. Retrieved
from https://www.npr.org/2017/10/24/559604836/majority-of-white-americans-thinktheyre-discriminated-against
Gray J. A. (1987). The psychology of fear and stress. Cambridge University Press; New York.
Gruenfeld, D.H. (1995). Status, ideology, and integrative complexity on the U.S. Supreme Court:
Rethinking the politics of political decision making. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 68, 5–20.
Haselton, M. G. & Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: A new perspective on biases in
cross-sex mind reading. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 81-91.
Hecht, D. B., Inderbitzen, H. M., & Bukowski, A. L. (1998). The relationship between peer status
and depressive symptoms in children and adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Child
Psychology, 26, 153–160.
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (2002). On modeling cognition and culture. Journal of Cognition and
Culture. 2, 87-112.
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist,52, 1280-1300.
Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and Prevention: Regulatory Focus as a Motivational Principle.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 1-46.
Hirt, E. R., McCrea, S. M., & Boris, S. I. (2003). “I know you self-handicapped last exam”:
Gender differences in reactions to self-handicapping. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 84, 177-193.

137
Hood, R. W., Jr., Hill, P. C., & Spilka, B. (2009). The psychology of religion: An empirical
approach (4th ed.). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Humphrey N.K. (1976). The social function of intellect. In: Bateson P.P.G, Hinde R.A, editors.
Growing points in ethology. Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, UK: pp. 303–317.
Jackson, S. D., & Mohr, J. J. (2016). Conceptualizing the closet: Differentiating stigma
concealment and nondisclosure processes. Psychology of Sexual Orientation and Gender
Diversity, 3, 80-92.
Jarvie, G. J., Lahey, B., Graziano, W., & Framer, E. (1983). Childhood obesity and social stigma:
What we know and what we don't know. Developmental Review, 3, 237-273.
Joachim, G., & Acorn, S. (2000). Stigma of visible and invisible chronic conditions. Journal of
Advanced Nursing, 32(1), 243-248.
Jones E. E., Farina A., Hastorf A. H., Markus H., Miller D. T., Scott R. A. (1984). Social Stigma:
The Psychology of Marked Relationships. New York: Freeman.
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the
production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1–27
Katz, I (1981). Stigma, a social psychological analysis. N.Y.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Katz, I (1991). Gordon Allport's "The Nature of Prejudice". Political Psychology, 12(1), 125-157.
Katz, I. (1979). Some thoughts about the stigma notion. Personality and Social Psychology, 5(4),
447-460.
Keating, C. F. (1985). Human dominance signals: The primate in us. In S. L. Ellyson & J. F.
Dovidio (Eds.), Power, dominance, and nonverbal behavior (pp. 89-108). New York:
Springer-Verlag.
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D.H, & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition.
Psychological Review, 110, 265–284.
Keltner, D., Young, R. C., Heerey, E. A., Oemig, C., & Monarch, N. D. (1998). Teasing in
hierarchical and intimate relations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(5),
1231-1247
Knowles, E. D., & Peng, K. (2005). White selves: conceptualizing and measuring a dominantgroup identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(2), 223-241.
Kurzban, R. & Leary, M. R., (2001). Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: the functions of
social exclusion. Psychological Bulletin, 127(2) 187-208.
Litman, L., Robinson, J., & Abberbock, T. (2016). TurkPrime.com: A versatile crowdsourcing
data acquisition platform for the behavioral sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 1-10.
Larsen, T (2010). No Christianity please, we’re academics. Inside Higher Ed. Leary, M. R.
(1999). The social and psychological importance of self-esteem. In R. M. Kowalski & M.
R. Leary (Eds.), The social psychology of emotional and behavioral problems: Interfaces
of social and clinical psychology (pp. 197–221). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.

138
Luhtanen, R. & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one’s social
identity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(3), 302-318.
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup Emotions: Explaining offensive
action tendencies in an intergroup context. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
79(4), 602-612.
Major, B., Spencer, S. J., Schmader, T., Wolfe, C., & Crocker, J. (1998). Coping with negative
stereotypes about intellectual performance: The role of psychological disengagement.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 34–50.
Major, B., & Crocker, J. (1993). Social stigma: The consequences of attributional ambiguity. In
D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition and stereotyping: Interactive
processes in group perception (pp. 345–366). San Diego, CA: Academic.
Mohr, J. J., & Fassinger, R. E. (2000). Measuring dimensions of lesbian and gay male experience.
Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 33, 66-90.
Mundy, P. (2017). A review of joint attention and social-cognitive brain systems in typical
development and autism spectrum disorder. European Journal of Neuroscience, 1-18.
Nesse, R. M. (2001). The smoke detector principle. Natural selection and the regulation of
defensive responses. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 935, pp. 75-85.
Nesse, R. M. (2005). Natural selection and the regulation of defenses: A signal detection analysis
of the smoke detector principle. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 88-105.
Neuberg, S. L., Smith, D. M., & Asher, T. (2000). Why people stigmatize: Toward a biocultural
framework. In T. F. Heatherton, R. E. Kleck, M. R. Hebl, & J. G. Hull (Eds.), The social
psychology of stigma (pp. 31–61). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Perry, S. P., Dovidio, J. F., Murphy, M. C., & van Ryn, M. (2015). The joint effect of bias
awareness and self-reported prejudice on intergroup anxiety and intentions for intergroup
contact. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 21(1), 89-96.
Phinney, J. S. (1990). Ethnic identity in adolescence and adulthood: A review and integration.
Psychological Bulletin, 108, 499-514.
Pratto, F. Sidanius, J. Stallworth, L. M. & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A
personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 67(4), 741-763.
Oyserman, D., Harrison, K., & Bybee, D. (2001). Can racial identity be promotive of academic
efficacy? International Journal of Behavioral Development, 25, 379 – 385.
Peterson, D. & Wrangham, R (1997). Demonic males: apes and the origins of human violence.
Mariner Books, Wilmington MA.
Platt, J. R. (1964). Strong inference, Science, 146(3642), 347-353.
Ponterotto, J. G., Burkard, A., Rieger, B. P., Grieger, I., D’Onofrio, A., Dubuisson, A., Heenehan,
M., Millstein, B., Parisi, M., Rath, J. F., & Sax, G. (1995). Development and Initial

139
Validation of the Quick Discrimination Index (QDI). Educational and Psychological
Measurement, 55(6), 1016-1031.
Ray, D. G., Mackie, D. M., Rydell, R. J., & Smith, E. R. (2008). Changing categorization of self
can change emotions about outgroups. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44,
1210-1213.
Reyson, S., & Branscombe, N. R. (2008). Belief in collective emotions as conforming to the
group, Social Influence, 3, 171-188.
Richardson, P. J., Boyd, R., & Henrich J. (2010). Gene-culture coevolution in the age of
genomics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107 (Supplement 2) 89858992; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0914631107
Rios, K., Cheng, Z. H., Totton, R. R., & Shariff, A. F. (2015). Negative stereotypes cause
Christians to underperform in and disidentify with science. Social Psychological and
Personality Science, 6, 959-967.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Ross, C.T., Richerson, P., Rogers D., (2013). Mechanisms of cultural change and the transition to
sustainability. Handbook of Global Environmental Pollution: Global Environmental
Change.
Royer, A. (1998). Life with chronic illness: Social and psychological dimensions. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Rubin, M., & Paolini, S. (2014). Out-group flies in the in-group’s ointment: Evidence of the
motivational underpinnings of the in-group overexclusion effect. Social Psychology, 45,
265-273.
Samson M (1999) Training for transformation, in Agenda, 33,6-25.
Schaller, M., & Neuberg, S. L. (2012). Beyond prejudice to prejudices. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 35(6), 445-446.
Schaller M., Duncan L. A. 2007. The behavioral immune system: its evolution and social
psychological implications. In Evolution and the social mind (eds Forgas J. P., Haselton
M. G., von Hippel W., editors.), pp. 293–307 New York, NY: Psychology Press.
Schmader, T. (2002). Gender identification moderates stereotype threat effects on woman’s math
performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(2), 194-201.
Schmader, T., Major, B., & Gramzow, R. H. (2001). Coping with ethnic stereotypes in the
academic domain: perceived injustice and psychological disengagement. Journal of
Social Issues, 57(1), pp. 93-111.
Seger, C. R., Smith, E. R. & Mackie, D. M. (2009). Subtle activation of a social categorization
triggers group-level emotions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 460-467.

140
Shin, H. Dovidio, J. F., & Napier, J. (2013). Cultural differences in targets of stigmatization
between individual and group-oriented cultures. Basic and Applied Social Psychology,
35(1), 98-108.
Shteynberg, G., & Apfelbaum, E. (2013). The power of shared experience: Simultaneous
observation with similar others facilitates social learning. Social Psychological and
Personality Science, 4, 738-744.
Shteynberg, G. (2010). A silent emergence of culture: The social tuning effect. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 683-689.
Solanka, L. (2017). Discrimination as Stigma: A Theory of Anti-discrimination Law. Portland
OR: Hart Publishing.
Smietana, B. (2016). Survey: Americans say Christians face intolerance, but complain too much
LifeWay Research Report.
Smith, E. R. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualizations of
prejudice. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping:
Interactive Processes in Group Perception (pp. 297–315). San Diego, CA: Academic
Press.
Smith, E. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2018) Intergroup Emotions. In M. Lewis, J. Havil and Jones & L.
Feldman Barrett (Eds.), Handbook of Emotions, 3rd ed. New York, NY: Guilford
Publications.
Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group level? Evidence
for four conceptual criteria. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 431–446.
Smith, D. S., Berg, M. E., Cook, R. G., Murphy, M. S., Crossley, M. J., Boomer, J., Spiering, B.,
Beran, M. J., Church, B. A., Ashby, F. G., & Grace, Grace, R. C. (2012). Implicit and
explicit categorization: A tale of four species. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral review,
36(10), 2355-2369.
Spencer, S. J., Steele, C. M., & Quinn, D. M. (1999). Stereotype threat and women’s math
performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 4–28.
Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. (2002). Contending with group image: The
psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 379 – 440). New York, NY: Academic
Press.
Steele, C.M., Spencer, S., Nisbett, R., Hummel, M., Harber, K., Schoem, D. and Carter, K.
(2004). African-American college achievement: A “wise” intervention, Unpublished
manuscript, Stanford University.
Steele, C. M. & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of
African Americans. Attitudes and Social Cognition, 69(5), 797-811.
Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. (2002). Contending with group image: The
psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. In M. P.Zanna (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (pp. 379–440). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

141
Stephan, C. W., Stephan, W. G., Demitrakis, K. M., Yamada, A. M., & Clason, D. L. (2000).
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 24, 63-73.
Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Morrison, K. R. (2009). Intergroup threat theory. In T. D. Nelson
(Ed.), Handbook of prejudice (pp. 43-60). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Streib, H., R.W. Hood, B. Keller, R.–M. Csöff and C. Silver. (2009). Deconversion. Qualitative
and Quantitative Results from Cross-Cultural Research in Germany and the United States
of America. Research in Contemporary Religion 5. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and
Ruprecht.
Sutton, S. K., & Davidson, R. J. (1997). Prefrontal brain asymmetry: A biological substrate of the
behavioral approach and inhibition systems. Psychological Science, 8, 204–210.
Tiedens, L. Z., & Ellsworth Batja Mesquita, C. P. (2000). Feeling your place: Emotional
consequences of social status positions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26,
5, 560-575.
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture. In J. Barkow, L.
Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the
generation of culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. (1996). Friendship and the Banker's Paradox: Other pathways to the
evolution of adaptations for altruism. In W. G. Runciman, J. Maynard Smith, & R. I. M.
Dunbar (Eds.), Evolution of Social Behaviour Patterns in Primates and Man.
Proceedings of the British Academy, 88, 119-143.
Von Hippel, W., Hawkins, C., & Schooler, J.W. (2001). Stereotype distinctiveness: How counterstereotypic behavior shapes the self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 81(2), 193-205.
Woods, J. D. (1994). The Corporate Closet. New York: Free Press.
Wright, B. A. (1983). Physical disability: A psychosocial approach. New York, NY: Harper &
Row.
Weaver, C. N. (2008). Social distance as a measure of prejudice among ethnic groups in the
United States. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38(3), pp. 779-795.
Yukl, G., & Falbe, C. M. (1990). Influence tactics and objectives in upward, downward, and
lateral influence attempts. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75, 132-140.
Zeder, M. A. (2017). Domestication as a model system for the extended evolutionary synthesis.
Interface Focus, 7(5).

142
Appendices
Appendix A – Demographics
1. What is your age?
2. What sex were you assigned at birth, on your original birth certificate?
a. Male
b. Female
3. When considering the concept of gender, do you believe there are more than two
possible genders?
a. There are only two natural genders
b. There are many gender identities to pick from as it depends on how you
feel and identify
3a. What is your gender <Display logic for Question 3 if A is picked>?
c. Male
d. Female
3b. What is your gender identity <Display logic for Question 3 if B is picked>?
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

k.
l.
m.

Cisgender Male or Born and Currently Identify as Male
Cisgender Female or Born and Currently Identify as Female
Agender or a person without gender.
Genderfluid or gender is expressed as felt
Genderqueer or may identify as male or female, between or beyond
genders, or a combination of genders
Intersex or the condition where a person was born with some combination
of physical gender attributes (may have some degree of mixed biology
between the traditional gender binary).
Gender Non-conforming or one who refuses to participate in the social
expectations of the Gender binary.
Transgender Male (born female but now identifies as male)
Transgender Female (born male but now identifies as female)

4. How do you describe your current gender?
a. Male
b. Female
c. Other [Text Enter]
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5. Do you identify as Hispanic or Latino - A person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto
Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of
race. Please select from the answers below.
a. Hispanic Latino
b. Not Hispanic Latino
c. I don't wish to answer
6. Of the racial identities listed below, which best represents you?
a. White (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having origins in any of the
original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa.
b. Black or African American (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having
origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa.
c. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A
person having origins in any of the peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or
other Pacific Islands.
d. Asian (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person having origins in any of the
original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian
Subcontinent, including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam.
e. American Indian or Alaska Native (Not Hispanic or Latino) - A person
having origins in any of the original peoples of North and South America
(including Central America), and who maintain tribal affiliation or
community attachment.
f. Two or More Races (Not Hispanic or Latino) - All persons who identify
with more than one of the above five races.
g. Other [Text Entry]
h. I don’t wish to answer
{BRANCH LOGIC WHEN NOT WHITE STUDY ONE}

7. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
a. Less than 9th grade
b. 9th to 12th grade, No diploma
c. High school education or equivalent
d. Some college, No degree
e. Associate Degree
f. Bachelor's degree
g. Graduate or Professional degree
8. Current marital status
a. Never married
b. Married - 1st marriage
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c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

Married - 2nd marriage
Married - 3rd marriage
Cohabitating/Unmarried partner
Domestic Partnership
Separated
Annulled
Divorced
Widowed
Other [Text Entry]

9. What is your current employment status?
a. Employed full time (40 or more hours per week)
b. Employed part-time (up to 39 hours per week)
c. Unemployed and currently looking for work
d. Unemployed and not currently looking for work
e. Student
f. Retired
g. Homemaker
h. Self-employed
i. Unable to work
j. Other [Text Entry]
10. What is your annual household income of you and your family? By definition, a
family is a group of individuals who are related by birth, marriage or adoption.
This can include parents, stepchildren, and/or siblings sharing household income.
It also includes unmarried partners who do have a child in common and live under
the same household. This excludes roommates who are not in some type of
coupled relationship.
[Text Entry]

11. What statement below best identifies your beliefs?
a. I am more religious than spiritual
b. I am more spiritual than religious
c. I am equally religious and spiritual
d. I am neither religious nor spiritual
12. What best identifies your beliefs?
a. Atheism
b. Agnosticism
c. Buddhism
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d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

Christian
Hinduism
Islam
Jewish
Pagan
Unitarian
Wicca
Other [Text Entry]

13. {If Christianity} Which type of Christianity do you identify most closely with?
a. Catholic
b. Protestant
c. Orthodox
d. Church of Latter Day Saints
e. Jehovah’s Witnesses
14. {If Christianity} What form or denomination of Christianity do you identify most
closely with?
a. Anabaptist
b. Anglican/Episcopal
c. Apostolic
d. Apostolic Pentecostal in the Historically Black Tradition
e. Assemblies of God
f. Baptist
g. Christian Reform Church
h. Church of Christ
i. Church of Christ, Scientist
j. Church of God
k. Church of the Nazarene
l. Disciples of Christ
m. Four Square Gospel
n. Holiness
o. Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod
p. Lutheran Church, Wisconsin Synod
q. Mennonites
r. Methodist
s. Methodist Episcopal Church
t. Moravians
u. Nondenominational
v. Presbyterian
w. Quakers (Friends)
x. Seventh-Day Adventist
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y. Wesleyan
z. Other [Text Entry]
15. Think about your beliefs (religious, spiritual, atheistic, agnostic, or otherwise).
Please review the definitions below. Which belief definition best represents you in
relation to the majority of people where you live. If you belong to a religious
denomination, think about the definitions below in relation to your membership in
the denomination.
a. My beliefs are considered culturally normal and common where I live.
When I share my beliefs with others, I experience little to no social tension
with others. My beliefs are common and/or accepted where I live.
b. I have beliefs, rituals, practices, and/or traditions which seem culturally
different than the mainstream culture where I live. These differences
create some social tension with others. While accepting of me as a person,
they may misunderstand my beliefs or think they are strange. Yet, I still
regularly interact with others where I live.
c. My beliefs dictate that I must avoid others where I live, and I attempt to do
so where appropriate. My beliefs connect me with a completely different
culture of others who share similar beliefs. This can include beliefs,
rituals, clothing, cultural practices, and/or community commitments. Some
outsiders where I live might perceive my beliefs or my community’s
beliefs to be extremely different from the norm.
16. Given the three categories of beliefs, is there any additional feedback about
yourself or this question you would like to share.
17. Regardless of how you registered to vote, which political description most closely
matches your political leanings?
a. Tea Party
b. Libertarian
c. Republican Christian Right
d. Republican Moderate (Fiscal Conservative without Religious Influence in
Government)
e. Right-Leaning Independent
f. Left-Leaning Independent
g. Democratic Moderate
h. Democratic Socialist
i. Green Party
18. Based on the last election, who would you vote for?
a. Gary Johnson
b. John Kasich
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c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.

Ted Cruz
Marco Rubio
Ben Carson
Jeb Bush
Carly Fiorina
Donald Trump
Bernie Sanders
Martin O'Malley
Hillary Clinton
Jill Stein
Evan McMullin

19. My political orientation is an important part of who I am. (Strongly Disagree to
Agree Strongly)
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Appendix B – Collective Self Esteem Scale
Instructions We are all members of different social groups or social categories. Some of
such social groups or categories pertain to gender, race, religion, nationality, ethnicity,
and socioeconomic class. We would like you to consider your memberships in those
particular groups or categories and respond to the following statements by how you feel
about those groups and your memberships in them. There are no right or wrong answers
to any of these statements; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please
read each statement carefully, and respond by using the following scale from 1 to 7
I am a worthy member of the social groups I belong to.
I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do.
Overall, my social groups are considered good by others.
Overall, my group memberships have very little to do with how I feel about myself.
I feel I don't have much to offer to the social groups I belong to.
In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to.
Most people consider my social groups, on the average, to be more ineffective than other
social groups.
The social groups I belong to are an important reflection of who I am.
I am a cooperative participant in the social groups I belong to.
Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile.
In general, others respect the social groups that I am a member of.
The social groups I belong to are unimportant to my sense of what kind of a person I am.
I often feel I'm a useless member of my social groups.
I feel good about the social groups I belong to.
In general, others think that the social groups I am a member of are unworthy.
In general, belonging to social groups is an important part of my self-image.
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Appendix C – Measure of Social Dominance Orientation.
Please choose the answer that best fits 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other
groups.
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at
the bottom.
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. (reverse scored)
10. Group equality should be our ideal. (reverse scored)
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. (reverse scored)
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (reverse
scored)
13. Increased social equality is beneficial to society. (reverse scored)
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. (reverse
scored)
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. (reverse scored)
16. No one group should dominate in society. (reverse scored)

150
Appendix D – Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Instructions Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about
yourself. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
2. At times I think I am no good at all.
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I certainly feel useless at times.
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
Scoring:
Items 2, 5, 6, 8, 9 are reverse scored. Give “Strongly Disagree” 1 point, “Disagree” 2
points, “Agree” 3 points, and “Strongly Agree” 4 points. Sum scores for all ten items.
Keep scores on a continuous scale. Higher scores indicate higher self-esteem.
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Appendix E – Quick Discrimination Index

This survey, called the Quick Discrimination Index, is designed to assess sensitivity,
awareness, and receptivity to cultural diversity and gender equity. Because this is a selfassessment inventory, it is essential that you respond to each item as honestly as possible.
This inventory is designed to assess subtle racial and gender bias. You can use this
inventory to become more aware of your attitudes and beliefs pertaining to these issues.
Directions: Remember there are no right or wrong answers. Please circle the appropriate
number to the right.
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 =Not Sure
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
1. I do think it is more appropriate for the mother of a newborn baby, rather than the
father, to stay home with the baby (not work) during the first year.
2. It is as easy for women to succeed in business as it is for men.
3. I really think affirmative-action programs on college campuses constitute reverse
discrimination.
4. I feel I could develop an intimate relationship with someone from a different race.
5. All Americans should learn to speak two languages.
6. It upsets (or angers) me that a woman has never been president of the United
States.
7. Generally speaking, men work harder than women.
8. My friendship network is very racially mixed.
9. I am against affirmative-action programs in business.
10. Generally, men seem less concerned with building relationships than women.
11. I would feel OK about my son or daughter dating someone from a different race.
12. It upsets (or angers) me that a full racial minority person has never been president
of the United States.
13. In the past few years, too much attention has been directed toward multicultural or
minority issues in education.
14. I think feminist perspectives should be an integral part of the higher education
curriculum.
15. Most of my close friends are from my own racial group.
16. I feel somewhat more secure that a man rather than a woman is currently
president of the United States.
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17. I think that it is (or would be) important for my children to attend schools that are
racially mixed.
18. In the past few years, too much attention has been directed toward multicultural or
minority issues in business.
19. Overall, I think racial minorities in America complain too much about racial
discrimination.
20. I feel (or would feel) very comfortable having a woman as my primary physician.
21. I think the president of the United States should make a concerted effort to
appoint more women and racial minorities to the country’s Supreme Court.
22. I think white people’s racism toward racial-minority groups still constitutes a
major problem in America.
23. I think the school system, from elementary school through college, should
encourage minority and immigrant children to learn and fully adopt traditional
American values.
24. If I were to adopt a child, I would be happy to adopt a child of any race.
25. I think there is as much female physical violence toward men as there is male
physical violence toward women.
26. I think the school system, from elementary school through college, should
promote values representative of diverse cultures.
27. I believe that reading the autobiography of Malcolm X would be of value.
28. I would enjoy living in a neighborhood consisting of a racially diverse population
(Asian, blacks, Latinos, whites).
29. I think it is better if people marry within their own race.
30. Women make too big a deal out of sexual harassment issues in the workplace.

Scoring for the QDI
The total score measures overall sensitivity, awareness, and receptivity to cultural
diversity and gender equality. Of the 30 items on the QDI, 15 are worded and scored in a
positive direction (high scores indicate high sensitivity to multicultural/gender issues),
and 15 are worded and scored in a negative direction (where low scores are indicative of
high sensitivity). Naturally, when tallying the total score response, these latter 15 items
need to be reverse-scored. Reverse scoring simply means that if a respondent circles a
“1” he or she should get five points, a “2” four points, a “3” three points, a “4” two
points, and a “5” one point.
The following QDI items need to be reverse-scored: 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19,
23, 25, 29, 30.
Score range = 30 to 150, with high scores indicating more awareness, sensitivity, and
receptivity to racial diversity and gender equality.
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Appendix F – Measure of Intergroup Emotions
Part One – Study One Outgroup Emotion Association Assessment
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Part Two – Outgroup Emotion Association Assessment

155
Appendix F – Generalized Sense of Power Scale

Instructions: In rating each of the items below, please use the following scale:
1 Disagree Strongly – 7 Agree Strongly
Given my own experience as a White Male /Christian individual and in my relationships
with Others.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

I can get people to listen to what I say.
My wishes so not carry much weight.
I can get others to do what I want.
Even if I voice them, my views have little sway.
I think I have a great deal of power.
My ideas and opinions are often ignored.
Even when I try, I am not able to get my way.
If I want to, I get to make the decisions.

<New Screen>
1 Disagree Strongly – 7 Agree Strongly
Given my membership in the group as a White Male /Christian and my relationships with
Others.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

I can get people to listen to what I say.
My wishes so not carry much weight.
I can get others to do what I want.
Even if I voice them, my views have little sway.
I think I have a great deal of power.
My ideas and opinions are often ignored.
Even when I try, I am not able to get my way.
If I want to, I get to make the decisions.
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Appendix G – Internalized Stigma of Mental Illness (Adapted for White Males and
Christians)
For each question, please mark whether you strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3),
or strongly agree (4).
Strongl Disag Agre Stron
y
ree
e
gly
disagre
agree
e
1. I feel out of place in the world because I am a White
Male /Christian.
2. White Males /Christians tend to be violent.
3. People discriminate against me because I am a White
Male /Christian.
4. I avoid getting close to people who are not White /
Christian to avoid rejection.
5. I am embarrassed or ashamed that I am a White Male
/Christian.
This Question was Removed
7. White Males /Christians make important
contributions to society.
8. I feel inferior to others who are not White Males
/Christians
9. I don’t socialize as much as I used to because my
race/religion might make me look or behave
“weird.”
10. People who are White Males /Christians cannot live
a good, rewarding life.
11. I don’t talk about myself much because I don’t want
to burden others with my concerns with
race/religion.
12. Negative stereotypes about White Males /Christians
keep me isolated from the “normal” world.
13. Being around people who are not White Male
/Christian makes me feel out of place or inadequate.
14. I feel comfortable being seen in public with other
White Males /Christians.
15. People often patronize me or treat me like a child,
just because I am a White Male /Christian.
16. I am disappointed in myself for being White Male
/Christian.
17. Being a White Male /Christian has spoiled my life.
18. People can tell that I am a White Male /Christian by
the way I look.

1
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3

4
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4
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Strongl Disag Agre Stron
y
ree
e
gly
disagre
agree
e
19. Because I am a White Male /Christian, I need others
to make most decisions for me.
20. I stay away from social situations in order to protect
my family or friends from embarrassment.
21. People who are not White Male /Christian could not
possibly understand me.
22. People ignore me or take me less seriously just
because I am a White Male /Christian
23. I can’t contribute anything to society because I
White Male /Christian.
24. Being White Male /Christian has made me a tough
survivor.
25. Nobody would be interested in getting close to me
because I am a White Male /Christian.
26. In general, I am able to live my life the way I want
to.
27. I can have a good, fulfilling life, despite me being a
White Male /Christian.
28. Others think that I can’t achieve much in life
because I am White Male /Christian
29. Stereotypes about White Male /Christian apply to
me.

1

2

3

4
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2

3
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The ISMI contains 29 items which produce five subscale scores and a total score. Each
score is calculated by adding the item scores together and then dividing by the total
number of answered items. If any items are not answered, the total number to be divided
by is reduced. The resulting score should range from 1-4. For example, if someone
answers 5 of the 6 Alienation items, the Alienation score is produced by adding together
the five answered items and dividing by 5.
Alienation (6 items)
1. I feel out of place in the world because I am White Male /Christian
5. I am embarrassed or ashamed that I am White Male /Christian
8. I feel inferior to others who are not White Male /Christian
16. I am disappointed in myself for being White Male /Christian
17. Being White Male /Christian has spoiled my life
21. People who are not White Male /Christian cannot possibly understand me
Stereotype Endorsement (7 items)
2. White Males/Christian people tend to be violent
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6. White Male/Christian people shouldn’t get married
10. White Males/Christians cannot live a good, rewarding life
18. People can tell that I am White Male /Christian by the way I look
19. Because I am White Male /Christian, I need others to make most decisions for me
23. I can’t contribute anything to society because I am White Male /Christian
29. Stereotypes about White Male /Christian apply to me
Discrimination Experience (5 items)
3. People discriminate against me because I am White Male /Christian
15. People often patronize me, or treat me like a child, just because I am White Male
/Christian
22. People ignore me or take me less seriously just because I am White Male
/Christian
25. Nobody would be interested in getting close to me because I White Male
/Christian
28. Others think that I can’t achieve much in life because I am White Male /Christian
Social Withdrawal (6 items)
4. I avoid getting close to people who are not religious or white to avoid rejection
9. I don’t socialize as much as I used to because I am a White Male /Christian and
afraid it might make me look or behave “weird”
11. I don’t talk about myself much because I don’t want to burden others with my
White Male / Christian
12. Negative stereotypes about White Male /Christian keep me isolated from the
“normal” world
13. Being around people who are not White Male /Christian makes me feel out of
place or inadequate
20. I stay away from social situations in order to protect my family or friends from
embarrassment
Stigma Resistance (5 items – reverse code before including in total score)
7. People who are White Male /Christian make important contributions to society
14. I feel comfortable being seen in public with a White Male /Christian
24. Being White Male /Christian has made me a tough survivor
26. In general, I am able to live my life the way I want to
27. I can have a good, fulfilling life, despite being White Male /Christian
As they are shown in the questionnaire, higher scores on these questions indicate
more resistance to stigma and therefore less internalized stigma. If you wish to
include them in the total score, you must reverse the scores before doing so. To
reverse the scores, subtract them from 5. Thus, a score of 1 becomes a 4 and a score
of 4 becomes a 1.
Total Score (29 items)
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Add together all the answered items and divide by the total number of answered items.
(If the person answered every question, divide by 29). Make sure to use reverse-coded
Stigma Resistance items.
Total Score without Stigma Resistance (24 items)
Same as above, but do not include the Stigma Resistance items. You may choose to
interpret these items separately or to leave them out altogether (Lysaker et al., 2007).
Interpretation of scores
4-category method (following the method used by Lysaker et al., 2007):
1.00-2.00:
minimal to no internalized stigma
2.01-2.50:
mild internalized stigma
2.51-3.00:
moderate internalized stigma
3.01-4.00:
severe internalized stigma
2-category method (following the method used by Ritsher & Phelan, 2004).
1.00-2.50:
does not report high internalized stigma
2.51-4.00
reports high internalized stigma
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Appendix H – Outness Inventory (adapted for Christians)

Use the following rating scale to indicate how open you are about being a Christian to the
people listed below. Try to respond to all of the items but leave items blank if they do not
apply to you. If an item refers to a group of people (e.g., work peers), then indicate how
out you generally are to that group.
1 = person definitely does NOT know you are a Christian
2 = person might know you’re Christian, but it is NEVER talked about
3 = person probably knows you’re a Christian, but it is NEVER talked about
4 = person probably knows you’re a Christian, but it is RARELY talked about
5 = person definitely knows you’re a Christian, but it is RARELY talked about
6 = person definitely knows you’re a Christian, and it is SOMETIMES talked about
7 = person definitely knows you’re a Christian, and it is OPENLY talked about
0 = not applicable to your situation; there is no such person or group of people in your
life

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

mother
father
siblings (sisters, brothers)
extended family/relatives
my new straight friends
my work peers
my work supervisor(s)
strangers, new acquaintances
my non-believer friends

Openness Inventory Scoring
Out to Family = average of items 1, 2, 3, and 4
Out to World = average of items 5, 6, 7, and 10
Overall Outness = average of the above two subscales
Why is Overall Outness scored by averaging subscales rather than items?
The factor analyses used to develop the scale suggested that outness has a hierarchical
factor structure, where overall outness is represented by lower-level domains of outness
(e.g., outness to family, outness in one’s religious institution). Thus, from a conceptual
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and measurement perspective, it makes the most sense to average the subscales rather
than the individual items. There is also a practical reason to score Overall Outness in this
manner. If Overall Outness were calculated by averaging together individual items, then
one would end up with a score that gives less weight to domains associated with fewer
items.
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Appendix I – Sexual Orientation Concealment Scale (adapted for Christians)

The following six items concern behaviors Christians sometimes use to hide their beliefs
or identity. Please rate each item to complete the following phrase:
In the last two weeks, I have...
Not at all
A little bit
Somewhat
Very much
All the time
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

concealed my Religion by denying that I was Christian.
concealed my Religion by avoiding contact with other open Christians.
avoided the subjects of theology, the Bible, worship or prayer.
allowed others to assume I am not religious without correcting them.
altered my appearance, mannerisms, or activities in an attempt to “pass” as not
Christian.
6. remained silent while witnessing Christian remarks, jokes, or activities because I
did not want to be labeled as a believer by those involved.
7. Hid religious activities such as prayer, church attendance, or bible study.
8. Wanted to proselytize to others but felt fear of rejection or concern for your
safety.
9. Concealed symbols or clothing of my faith
10. Spoke ill of fellow believers to prove I was not an insider or believer.
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